

HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

PSYCHOLOGY

THE SOUL OF A CHRISTIAN

HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

A TEXTBOOK OF POLITICS

BY

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HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

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BOOK I.—SOCIOLOGICAL STATICS

CHAPTER I

THE DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF SOCIOLOGY

1. *Sociology as the Theory of Human Fellowship.*—The name, Sociology, was invented by Auguste Comte, the founder of the positivist philosophy. In order to form this name, Comte took the Latin word 'socius,' which means a companion or fellow, and the Greek word 'logos,' which may be translated 'theory.'

The word is thus a hybrid. But it was intentionally chosen by Comte in order to declare the joint effect of Greek and Roman

civilization upon the world. Human fellowship in its highest and most characteristic forms cannot be rightly understood without some reference to ancient Greece and Rome. Greece educated Rome, and Rome has educated the world.

2. *Sociology as a Synthetic Science*.—The advance of human knowledge shows itself in two ways. On the one hand there is the positive increase in knowledge which takes place when discoveries are made. Thus three chemical elements were discovered between 1875 and 1885, namely, Gallium, Scandium, and Germanium. On the other hand our knowledge is increased when we set in better order what is already known and draw conclusions from it. It is possible in this way from existing materials to prophecy future knowledge. The great Russian chemist Mendeleeff actually described in advance the three elements already named, and gave them the titles, Ekaaluminium, Ekaboron, and Ekasilicium. It is a useful test of the advancement of a science when we inquire whether through its principles we can deduce new and valid

consequences in the same way that Mendeleeff did. Now sociology is supplied with material from various quarters, as we shall see in detail when we come to the next chapter. But the value of the study of sociology is only vindicated when we can use it to draw new and fruitful conclusions. Since in this way the several deductions from our principles are 'put together,' the name synthetic may fairly be given to the science. But the synthetic method is capable of serious abuse (Ch. VI, § 5).

In this respect sociology has been overtaken by biology. Biology takes the material furnished by the several sciences of life and deduces from them new and important conclusions; and many of these new conclusions are becoming common property and are more generally received than the conclusions of sociology. Yet it is not very long since all that is concerned directly with the science of life was grouped together for the first time, and received the name biology, that is, the theory of life. As late as 1876 Huxley said: 'There are, I believe, some persons who

imagine that the term biology is a new-fangled designation.' In the same address he spoke of sociology as a constituted science. Hence we are far from venturing upon new ground when we speak of the science of sociology.

3. *Sociology as a Positive Science.*—Most persons would agree with this description of sociology, and therefore we will consider it first. As a positive science it deals both with certain groups of facts and with the interpretation of these facts. The interpretation includes the grouping and classification of facts: the discovery and statement of the general laws under which these facts fall, the arrangement of these facts, classifications, and laws into a system. In order to understand clearly what is meant when we say that sociology is a positive science, let us take a convenient example of a positive science like chemistry. To a certain extent sociology is as strictly a science as chemistry.

4. *Sociology as more than a Positive Science.*—For some time it was thought by many of the students of sociology that sociology could

proceed in the same way as other positive sciences, like chemistry. But to confine oneself to the positive side of sociology is the mark of the rationalist. He arranges facts and forms inferences from them in their isolation from man, and thus leaves out the special factors which are introduced by man's individual character. Since man not only lives in the world, but makes it and judges it, no merely positive interpretation of social life can be adequate. For it leaves out of account all judgments of value. To the biologist it is indifferent whether the microbe or the human organism is victorious in a case of fever. The sociologist judges that man is of more value than many microbes. He brings in a judgment of value which is not known to positive science,

5. *Sociology as a Normative Science.*—

Sociology sets up a standard of value, therefore, by which it measures things. As metaphysics sets up the standard of the 'real,' as logic sets up the standard of the 'consistent,' so sociology sets up the standard of the 'conscious individual.' It refers to

mental and moral laws what is characteristic of human life in common. The distinction between positive and normative sciences may be illustrated from morals. To steal is condemned by the moral 'norm' or standard. But a science like mathematics, which takes no account of moral values, does not distinguish between ten stolen coins and ten coins of the same amount properly earned. The difference only comes in when we refer the matter to human law.

Since, therefore, sociology deals with man, it will fall into line with the other sciences which deal with man. That is to say, it will have two aspects. On the one hand it will be concerned with man so far as he is part of the complex order of nature. Man will be regarded as subject to the laws of physics, chemistry, and physiology. To that extent sociology, as we have seen, is positive. But man is something more than the subject of a positive science. He is not merely governed by, but he shares in, the moral order of the world. Man rises above the world and judges it so far as he values it. 'The great

man,' says Eucken, 'lifts the common life to an essentially higher plane. He does not merely unify existing tendencies, but brings about an inner transformation: he ennobles the whole message of the age.' Here we come upon a positive contribution of sociology, In order to understand the history of the world, we must examine the part which the genius of the individual plays in constructing the future into which the present is always passing.

6. *Sociology as referring Events to the Individual.*—We started with a definition of sociology which merely set out the meaning of the constituent parts of the word, the theory of fellowship. But we want a definition which shall tell us something more: we want a real definition, and not merely a verbal one. What is it that sociology does?

We may very well go first to the distinguished French thinker who coined the word and ask him for an answer. And we may paraphrase what he has to say as follows. As distinguished from other sciences, sociology assumes, first, that there are certain

laws which may be traced in social life and nowhere else. Secondly, sociology employs observation and experiment to find out what these laws are. For example, there is the law that social activity tends to follow the line of least resistance; that is to say, people tend to seek what is easiest. Men gather where it is easiest to get a living. Hence people come into the cities in so far as it is easier to get employment there. A circumstance like this, so far as it holds good, may be marked off as a tendency. Why do we not say that it is a general law? The answer to this question is instructive. In social life, owing to a circumstance which we may call by various names, of which free will is only one, a tendency may excite us to fight against it, because it conflicts with the standards by which we judge things.

The natural sciences, as such, observe causes and effects from the outside. No one really knows how the iron feels when it is melted, even if it feels at all. On the other hand, we can not only enumerate causes and effects in sociology, but we can partici-

pate in them from the inside, so to speak. We can all experience, or at least imagine, the impulse which makes human beings seek the easiest ways to obtain a livelihood. This is indeed a fundamental distinction. On the one hand we have the sciences which look at events from the outside: on the other hand, the sciences which can employ consciousness as well. Now it is just this last quality which will help us to a better definition of sociology. By a better definition I mean one which permits us to draw more fruitful conclusions. Sociology, then, is the study of social facts in the light of mental and moral science, that is, in the light of our knowledge of man as a conscious and moral being.

Now man in these respects is specifically unlike any other being. I say specifically, and not generically, because we must not lose sight of some suggestive relationships between man and the rest of nature. I say he is specifically different, because to dwell upon man's general resemblances to the rest of nature is to miss the real meaning of his constitution (*supra*, § 3).

7. *Sociological Statics and Dynamics.*—

But we shall be concerned not only with the constitution of the groups which go together to make up the huge societies of men which we call nations, we shall also consider the chief motives which lead to changes, to reforms and revolutions. The first part of our studies will be devoted to examining how societies are built up, that is to say, sociological statics (Chaps. I–IX); the second, to examining how changes are brought about in constituted societies, that is to say, sociological dynamics (Chaps. X, XI).

Such is the outline of our subject. If we can succeed to any extent in filling in this outline, we shall be able to draw conclusions as to the future from the principles, and laws, and classifications to which we attain. And these conclusions, therefore, will be of the nature of prophecies. If through our study we can explain the history of the past, we shall also be able, using the same methods, to forecast some of the probable events of the future. Thus we shall set before us the ultimate hope of rendering

the method of historical study still more fruitful, and also of furnishing material for the philosophy of history. These are bold anticipations. But we enter upon a heritage enriched by many workers in many fields. As we survey their several contributions in the pages that follow, we shall find that they have helped to realize the impressive prophecy with which Mill closed his *System of Logic*. The innumerable treatises which have directly or indirectly contributed to the facts and principles of sociology have been based upon scientific inquiry as applied to the moral and social departments of knowledge. A great part of this work has consisted in description: the description of human beings in their surroundings. And the school to which the compilers of statistics have resorted, is that of the great realists who have written novels. Tolstoy, Zola, Hardy, have helped to make possible the statistics which set before us the life of villages, cities, countries. But there is a practical application of statistics in so far as they interpret to us the life amid which we

find ourselves. We shall have gained something if we learn to dwell with interest and pleasure amid the things which we already pass. Reform and change are part of life, but at any moment they are the lesser part.

8. *Unfruitful Character of Positivist Sociology.*—Now, unfortunately, it was the characteristic of Auguste Comte, and of some of his English followers, notably, Herbert Spencer, to dwell upon general resemblances almost to the disregard of specific differences. And this method is really the essence of what Comte called the positive philosophy. But if you lay stress rather upon the process of generalization than upon the opposite process of specification, you will go from what is less general to what is more general, until you find yourself with theories so wide that they are painfully thin and unfruitful, so that you can draw very poor conclusions from them. It is on these lines that Herbert Spencer in his *First Principles* gradually reduces all phenomena to examples of the persistence of force. ‘The highest achievement of science,’ he says, ‘is the interpretation of all orders of

phenomena, as differently conditioned manifestations of this one kind of effect (i.e. of the underlying force) under differently conditioned modes of this one kind of uniformity.' Here we have formalism run riot. It is a sufficient criticism of Spencer to show that he leaves no room for genius in his scheme. The postulate, that nature is uniform, is barren until it is filled in with the successive orders of reality. And at each stage in our advance from one order of reality to next, our descriptions become richer and less to be foreseen; at each step the gulf that separates one order of attributes from the next is wider. It is a far cry from pure mathematics to physics. But it is a farther one from physics to chemistry. Still farther is it from chemistry to the science of life. Farthest of all is it from mere life to life conscious and moralized. And it is this last step that we must take in passing from the natural sciences to sociology.

9. *Sociology as enriched by Statistics.*—But these other sciences have been preparing the way for sociology. The facts with which

sociology is concerned are unusually likely to be misunderstood. Only by the most elaborate and careful descriptions can we be provided with the facts upon which we may work. Hence the methods of description and definition which provide the less complex sciences with their facts, require to be concentrated upon the complex facts of sociological inquiry. And so the study of statistics as such, almost apart from the inferences to be drawn from them, is an essential part of sociology.

Let us assume—and this is very great presumption indeed—that our statistics are reasonably accurate; only then is it worth the while of the student to attempt to interpret them. Some people, indeed, seem to think that any printed statement in which figures appear is a contribution to statistics. We shall devote the next chapter to considering the collection and use of statistics.

10. *Sociology as embodied in Social Workers.*—In the next place, a science is not something that can be locked up in books. When we talk about a science we should rather

think of the individuals scattered here and there who have devoted themselves, often without any thought of reward, to the task both of increasing and of developing human knowledge in that particular direction. ✓ The science of sociology is embodied in the students of sociology. ✓ Hence we can best understand the science by observing the lines along which the most successful students are working or have worked. There is a close tie between the progress of this study and the activities of the social worker. In order to carry out social reforms which are also social experiments, it is advisable to collect as much information as possible which bears upon the subject taken in hand. And the information which is thus gathered is available for the student. It might even be said that the social reformer by his work is helping to constitute the science of social life.

11. *The widening of the Outlook of the Social Worker.*—‘Social life’ is a comprehensive phrase which becomes more than a mere phrase for the sincere social worker. But the social worker suffers if he confines his

outlook to one particular province. Hence he will gain from the wide survey of things to which sociology is committed. On the one hand sociology is related to biology ; on the other, to psychology and ethics, politics, political economy, and history. Let us now proceed to trace these relationships.

12. *Sociology and other Sciences.*—Let us resume our previous definitions of sociology. It is a theory of human fellowship, and it studies social facts in the light of our knowledge of man as a conscious and moral being. But psychology is ordinarily understood to occupy itself with the consciousness of the individual ; and ethics in like manner is understood to occupy itself with the moral life of the individual. Since human society is made up of individuals, it is clear that sociology must draw some of its principles from psychology and ethics. But society, or a group of human beings, is not merely composed of individuals thrown together at random. It is like an organic body, in which the different parts have each their function to perform in the whole body of

which they form a part. And when the whole body is in health, that is to say in normal working, each organ reaps the benefit of the co-operation in which it is a partner. Sociology, therefore, treats human society as not merely composed of atoms, but of individuals organized into one body.

Now it is impossible to understand the sciences of politics, of political economy, and of history, without the help of the principles furnished by sociology. Sociology therefore stands to them as a more general subject to the particular developments of social study. The politician, the economist, the historian, all share in common the results to which sociology arrives.

13. *Sociology and Biology*.—Since societies of human beings resemble organisms in so many respects, biology, which deals with individual living organisms, will furnish many useful analogies in order to explain social facts. Now the extreme individualist will say that to speak of society as an organism is to use a figure of speech, and a misleading one at that. It is necessary, therefore, to

show that some societies are like organized bodies.

In the first place, the persons who live in the same city or the same country are usually descended for the most part from ancestors who have lived in the same city or country; and since our ancestors have intermarried, it follows that there are ties of kinship near or distant between very large numbers of us.

Along with natural relationships and affinities, there go usually common institutions and common customs among which the use of the same language takes a leading place.

Along with common institutions and a common language there goes a common experience determined by the fact that such a society lives in the same environment.

Hence there arise further affinities of all kinds. Of these, religious affinities are an important type. The persons who belong to the same religious community are often conscious of a feeling of religious kinship. The greatness of the apostle Paul largely consisted in this: that, for the old Jewish Church founded upon the tie of blood, he substituted

the Christian community founded upon a spiritual brotherhood.

Again, the revolutionary movements of the last century used the terms of kinship to express the intimacy of their adherents. Fraternity was a watchword of the first French revolutionists. It is a watchword of the revolutionist everywhere who feels that existing institutions treat men too much as mere units, isolated counters in the game of life, instead of living flesh and blood. And it is a like feeling that inspires the present-day revolt in England against the Poor Law, in so far as it treats poverty as an excuse for excommunicating paupers from the community of free men.

But the reason why it is now felt to be wrong for us to treat the destitute as excommunicated persons, is because we are more conscious than before that poverty and destitution may be found along with good qualities; that those who are not economically our brethren, may be our spiritual brethren, and *vice versa*. There was a squalid person who opened the doors of cabs in the age that

preceded motor-cars, in the hope of a few coppers which might provide him the necessary drug, a mouthful of food and a pallet for the night. It is probable that this same person was of more importance for the poetic and spiritual history of the world than all the cab-taking rich who threw him an odd copper. For he was Francis Thompson. Thus it appears that the possession of certain types of mind by groups of individuals is the real basis of brotherhood.

Patriotism in its best sense consists in the feeling of racial brotherhood, and in common traditions, combined with devotion to certain purposes held in common. Thus men are not to be treated as isolated and absolutely independent individuals. Just as in the Christian Church Paul says 'we are members one of another,' and finds the unity of the body of Christians in the spirit of Jesus, so generally men tend to enter into ties of spiritual kinship so far as they are dominated by the same poetic and spiritual ideas. That is to say, we must understand the workings of the human consciousness and of moral purposes if we

are to understand social facts. But our psychology and ethics must be adequate to this task.

14. *Sociology and Politics.* — How does sociology stand to politics? The answer to this question is a rebuke. Politics is the science of the 'polis,' or human community. For Plato, and then for Aristotle, politics was much the same as what we call sociology. But the narrower ideas and purposes of modern life have so limited and degraded political conceptions, that Comte thought that he was inventing a name for something without a name when he invented the term 'sociology.' Listen to Aristotle's definition of politics :—

'Since we see that every City is a Community, and that every Community is constituted for the sake of some common Good, it is clear that all Cities aim at some Good, and the Community which is most properly so-called and embraces the others, aims at the Good most properly so-called. And such is what we call the City and the Political Community.' Owing to the contempt which is

felt in England for abstract speculation, the successive degradations of the term politics, beginning with the year 1700, have escaped general notice. The members of the great political parties are very properly shocked to find that their opponents do not take a lofty view of political standards of conduct. But this state of things is universal, and rises out of the circumstances of the case. We might therefore define politics as a degenerate form of sociology, in which all parties, old and new, attempt to turn the power of the whole state to their own material interests and to the artificial predominance of their own partial ideas and purposes. An adequate conception of justice can correct this tendency. And such a conception is almost lacking in the history of English thought.

Only so far as it is recognized that there are ultimate moral laws, is it possible for the various parties in a state to work together. It is instructive to assemble the names of those persons who have tried to adopt a policy of 'sweet reasonableness.' Falkland and Defoe in England, Mirabeau in France,

are notable for having raised their voices in favour of a just course when party passions were rising very high.

Mirabeau tried to do justice to all sides ; more than this, tried to get every one to take a reasonable view. So long as he lived to advise, Louis xvi was a real king because he was a reasonable king. When Mirabeau died, Louis took Marie Antoinette as chief counsellor. And Marie Antoinette made a peaceful revolution impossible. But, you say, if Mirabeau had lived, the course of events would have been different. This is a useless speculation. Mirabeau could not live. In that turmoil of waste and distress, of insolence and resentment, men could not be reconciled. Compromise was impossible just because human nature was too limited to contain the elements which were in conflict. Compromise means that Tom and Dick and Harry fight out their battles in one poor brain, instead of engaging in real fisticuffs. When prize-fighters and soldiers are no more, there will still be battles in which men are arena and combatants as well. And Mirabeau,

with some of our English statesmen of to-day, have worn themselves out in attempting the difficult task of treating men as rational beings, instead of appealing to their passions.

The advantage of the party system is that it provides a man with both friends and enemies. Of no party man can it be said that he is no man's enemy but his own. By profession he is the enemy of the other side, and the friend of his own. Therefore our English politicians feel that there is something higher than political life. The social life in a free state where men can meet as equals, is something higher than the professed encounters in the House of Commons or at public meetings, where the speaker attempts to bribe his audience near or remote, and the audience exercises that fatal bias upon the orator which corrupts both audience and orator alike.

No student of sociology can understand political life so long as he fails to recognize the danger of the appeal to class interests. On the other hand, he will find a clue to many

difficulties if he applies the test of economical gain. Let him turn to works like Thorold Rogers' *Economic Interpretation of History*.

15. *Sociology and Political Economy*.—If we clearly understand that sociology is the fundamental science upon which certain other sciences rest, we shall not expect from any one of the derived sciences that which can only be given by the whole group of these sciences. Many critics of the methods of political economy argue as if political economy had for its business to furnish a complete theory of human society. They should rather inquire what is the proper place of economics in the circle of the sociological sciences. It cannot be the business of each of these sciences to do over again what is done for them by sociology. The political economist takes for granted a theory of man's nature. What he is specially concerned with is the way in which man gets his living. On this topic he will have something to say to the sociologist and even to the psychologist. If the reader has followed the argument of this chapter, he will see that it would be almost as unreasonable

to demand from economics a theory of the individual mind (that is, psychology) as a theory of social life (that is sociology).

16. *Sociology and History*.—History deals with the succession of human experiences as determined in the order of time. It seeks to exhibit the sources and the causes of these experiences so far as can be done by the various forms of tradition and of records. Now in so far as the historian employs comparison in order to interpret the special series of events with which for the time he is concerned; his method overlaps with that of the sociologist. It is through the comparative method that he co-operates with sociology. But for all that he is not a sociologist.

Nor is the philosophy of history identical with sociology. It is possible to study the theory of human fellowship in the light of psychology and ethics without attempting to set forth the meaning of history considered as a whole. And there is reason for believing that the study of sociology suffers if it is too much pursued in the light of preconceived ideas or purposes. Sociology as a

science has been hampered by the fact that Comte treated it too much from the standpoint of his own positivist philosophy of history. For the positivist school of sociologists identify the progress of the science with their own propaganda. Some of their adherents assume the title of 'ethical' for their societies, as though they had the monopoly of ethics. There is a similar objection to some uses of the word 'sociological.' Neither ethics nor sociology connotes the attribute 'positivist.'

17. *Sociology and Evolution.*—The work of the notion of evolution in the history of thought has been this: for the notion of an absolute beginning such as is presented in the first chapter of *Genesis*, it has substituted the rule that we must seek the cause of each state of things in the state which immediately preceded. Instead of the notion of a series of events in which there was a frequent interposition of fresh causes from a higher power, evolution insists upon the continuity of causes and effects: each event being both effect and cause in turn. But the demand that a cause

should be assigned for every effect is only one of the many expressions of the Law of the Sufficient Reason. And the demand for continuity in the course of events is a postulate which is very doubtful. That is to say, that the general theory of evolution is a formal theory which tells us nothing material about the facts to which it is referred. It represents an attitude of mind which has been of great service in the interpretation of facts. But it is probable that the function of the idea of evolution has been misunderstood. For, like other abstract notions, evolution has chiefly a negative value. It has freed speculation from too heavy a bondage to preconceived ideas. But in the hands of some persons it has been used to establish a fresh bondage scarcely less heavy than the old one. For it has been attempted to deduce from this abstract notion of evolution a philosophy of history. As in the chapters which follow there is unrolled before the reader's eye the incalculable panorama of human genius and achievement, he will be able to judge for himself how much help he is likely to obtain from the prophecies

of a mechanical formalism. Think of the drama contained in the history of Europe in the nineteenth century, and then consider how far the meaning of this drama is explained to us when we come across Herbert Spencer's definition of evolution. 'Evolution is an integration of matter, and concomitant dissipation of motion: during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a like transformation' Herbert Spencer anticipated the reduction of all biological and chemical processes to the terms of physics. This reduction certainly seems conceivable. But it is another matter to deal with the conscious life of man as an individual and as a member of a society. Such an explanation as that which has just been quoted fails to explain those things in the world which most call for explanation: the spiritual and the poetic experiences of mankind. Blake's prayer—

'May God us keep
From single vis on and Newton's sleep!'

is a quaint but germane criticism upon the physical theory of evolution. Since this form of the theory excludes all real explanation of the conscious life of mankind, the temperament to which it appeals may fairly be compared to a sleep.

18. *Modification of the Theory of Human Evolution.*—The theory of evolution, as it was stated by Darwin and Herbert Spencer, breaks down when it passes from the general to the particular, from the origin of species to the origin of the individual. The argument from difference will be developed in the third chapter, which will deal with Genius.¹

The Darwinian theory of evolution has been subjected to criticism by Dr. Wallace on the ground that it does not explain the occurrence of certain faculties in mankind such as the mathematical and musical faculties.² In 1893, Huxley said in the Romanes Lecture, that 'Social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step, and the substitution for it of another which may be called the ethical process.' In other words, natural

¹ *Infra*, p. 55.

² *Darwinism*, ch. xv.

selection and the continuous accumulation of small differences seem inadequate to explain what is most characteristic in man.

In 1894, Mr. Benjamin Kidd, in his *Social Evolution*, advanced the paradoxical hypothesis that there is no rational sanction for progress, for the reason that the interest of the individual is not necessarily in agreement with that of the society, and that therefore the individual will not, on rational grounds, sacrifice himself for the benefit of society. In other words, self-sacrifice is irrational, and therefore will not be performed by rational beings as such. The fallacy that underlies this argument of Mr. Kidd's turns upon the definition of reason. Mr. Kidd apparently is still under the bondage of English idealism. He assumes that the idea of self-satisfaction in some form or other is the form in which a rational motive will present itself. But if we regard reason as the direct apprehension of an object, if reason is concerned with things and persons, and only in the second place with ideas and abstractions, which it treats as if they were things, then reason may find satisfaction

in the apprehension of a world order no less than in other forms of apprehension. And this is implied in Mr. Kidd's essay written some years later, when he identifies the cosmic process with the ethical process. By the term 'ethical' is to be understood that which satisfies the demands of our moral reason. Thus evolution as applied to social order becomes transformed into something not unlike a philosophy of history.

19. *Vico's New Science*.—In order, therefore, to understand the present social order we must try to grasp the meaning of the Greco-Roman civilization upon which to so large an extent it has been built. From time to time the western world has broken away from its masters. But there has always been a reaction, and this has resulted in a renaissance. Sociology leads us back again to Greece and Rome. Vico anticipated in his *Scienza Nuova* much that passes for new nowadays. 'We observe,' says Vico, 'that all nations, both savage and civilized, have these three human customs: that all have some religion, all contract solemn matrimony, all bury their

dead. Therefore we have taken these three eternal and universal customs for the three principles of this science'¹ If, as a recent biographer² says, his new science is both a theology and a sociology, Vico's system seems to include all that is necessary for a complete theory of social evolution. It is probable that more justice will be done in the near future to this very original writer. As we have seen, the notion of evolution requires considerable qualification. Hence we shall be ready to acknowledge the scientific character of much speculation which, like Vico's, contains the leading principles upon which the science of sociology rests, although hitherto the concrete character of Vico's work has caused him to be misunderstood. Vico, in tracing institutions to a primitive 'roughness,' employs a genuinely evolutionary method. He interprets primitive Roman customs by the customs of his own day in Florence and Naples.³ In this and other instances he formulates the method of com-

¹ *Scienza Nuova* (Milan, 1801), I, 135.

² *Flour*, I, 15, 16.

³ *Scienza Nuova*, II, 119.

parative religion and folklore. That is to say, he refers the origin of institution and customs to the states of mind which produced them. And lastly, in basing his work upon Greek and Roman antiquity he follows a method of which the importance can easily be demonstrated. The student of sociology, therefore, will do well to give some attention to Vico, not so much on account of the information which he undoubtedly supplies, as because in this way we can view the recent work that has been done in sociology through a better perspective, a perspective which extends past Vico to Aristotle and Plato.

20. *Genius and Heredity*.—We shall now proceed to consider the first great modification which we must make in the notion of evolution so far as it is applied to human society. It is not true that heredity involves a narrow range of variation as we pass from each generation to the next. The characteristics of each individual reproduce the characters of the parents in proportions that may differ very widely in each family. And the range of variation is so great that from time

to time there arises what is equivalent to a fresh type. Man is the highest of living beings. And at the same time he exhibits the greatest range of variation. This may be expressed by saying that the difference between one human being and another is often equivalent to the difference between one species and another. The term 'genius' is the name for this difference carried to a very high degree. The attempt which some sociologists have made to explain human society, without taking account of genius in this sense, renders barren much that passes for serious work.

21. *Genius and Destiny*.—In the second place, there is an extraordinary concurrence between the rise of genius and the conditions which give effect to it. And this concurrence seems to go beyond coincidence and to justify the attempt to formulate a philosophy of history. The historian scarcely knows which to admire the most—Alexander or the Greek world to which he gave a shape, Julius Cæsar or the Roman Empire, Paul or the Church of the Gentiles.

CHAPTER II

THE FACTS OF SOCIOLOGY

1. *Statistics furnish Sociological Material.*—

A primary need of the student of sociology is to acquaint himself with the best means of determining the facts of his science. 'The first condition is that there shall be plenty of material,' says Westermarck. 'What is wanting in quality must be made up for in quantity.'¹ Speculations based upon insufficient data are the bane of modern politics, because, owing to the greater readiness of modern executives, they often lead to action. And action without careful consideration of the whole of the facts leads to consequences which are usually in part disastrous. Good intentions are not a

¹ *Human Marriage*, p. 4.

sufficient excuse for the neglect to inform oneself.¹

2. *Sociological Facts.*—These are the circumstances of human beings so far as they form part of an organized community. Some of these circumstances we can observe for ourselves. The power to do this is indispensable to the sociologist. We must rediscover for ourselves the significance of the obvious. We must train ourselves to detect the social bearings of the things and events that pass before us. We most of us live, as it happens, in a rather advanced state of society. And we must try to detect the fundamental likenesses which, amid differences, unite the higher to the lower forms of civilization. For example, if we are to follow Vico,² we must take note of the three leading features of human life, the customs which accompany religion, marriage, and burial. Unless we can see something of the significance of leading circumstances such as these when they

¹ An excellent introduction to the Study of Statistics is furnished by JEVONS, *Principles of Science*, bk. i.

² P. 32

are before us, we shall not be able to understand statistics, and the comparisons which are based upon them. One of the great charms of sociological study, and one of its best uses, is to prepare us to see in the life of the street, the factory, and the farm, something more complex and more impressive than we can find apart from human life. The labour which is now being expended upon the collection and the tabulation of sociological facts has its reward. Whether the observer takes the life of a poor quarter of London, such as West Ham, or whether he takes the circumstances of a particular calling such as Mr. Dearle has done for the London building trades, he shows that the observation and description of social facts (which at first sight seem monotonous and meaningless) can throw most valuable light upon the general problems of human destiny. There is no excuse, therefore, for those who turn away with disdain from these inquiries, as if they were of little value, or uninteresting. Matthew Arnold, who quarrelled with all the rest of England for being picturesque but not in the

same way as Oxford, caricatured the Social Science Congress. 'A great room in one of our dismal provincial towns; dusty air and jaded afternoon twilight; benches full of men with bald heads and women in spectacles; an orator lifting up his face from a manuscript written within and without.' But anything might be expected from one who, like Matthew Arnold, slandered the pleasant suburb of Mapperley where I am writing, and where the southern limits of the forest of Sherwood die away upon the Keuper marl. 'The dismal Mapperley hills—how dismal those who have seen them will remember,' says this critic. I will not wrong many charming ladies of my acquaintance by comparing him to an old maid. But the sociologist had better learn his lesson from Walt Whitman, read in some such selection as that of the *Canterbury Poets*. He will bring to his inquiries a temper which is well described in *The Song of the Open Road*:—

'Here the profound lesson of reception;
no preference, no denial. The black with his
woolly head, the felon, the diseas'd, the

illiterate person, are not denied: none but are accepted, none but shall be dear to me.'

3. *Ancient Law as a Guide*.—In order to understand the institutions which largely determine to-day the courses of our lives, we must know something about their origins and history. We may, generally speaking, pursue these inquiries best along the lines of ancient law: not, of course, that we shall have to study ancient law in its details, but only so far as light is thrown upon our subject. Ancient law is specially helpful by disclosing to us the intention of primitive institutions. For in studying these past events we enter into and sympathize with the ideas of those who have lived before us. Unless we can revive the past by the help of the historic imagination, the mere enumeration of circumstances will not help us in forming correct general ideas upon social matters. Further, it is only as we apply just standards of value that we can gain that central standpoint from which everything falls into its place as part of a system. Hence ancient law, by disclosing to us the standards of value

which primitive peoples employed, enables us to remove the doubt which attaches to the appeal to history, namely, how can we be sure that we have entered into the minds of these earlier dwellers upon the earth's surface? One of the best introductions to the study of the past is Maine's *Ancient Law*, of which the object is stated to be 'to indicate some of the earliest ideas of mankind, as they are reflected in *Ancient Law*, and to point out the relation of those ideas to modern thought.'

4. *Stages of Culture*.—In tracing the development of human life it is convenient to distinguish between three stages of culture. We may express this distinction in the form of a law. *Mankind advances from savagery to barbarism and from barbarism to civilized life.* This process should be stated only as a tendency. For it may be interfered with. The contact of a higher with a lower form of culture usually disturbs both. Sometimes the higher form of culture is unable to maintain itself against the lower. This circumstance is strikingly illustrated in various ways by the history of the southern coast of the

Mediterranean. Even where the higher form of culture is supreme, it is affected in various harmful ways by the neighbourhood of an inferior race. The problem of the negro in the United States is repeated in slightly differing forms in South Africa and Australia. The effect of this contact is even more dangerous for the inferior races. The struggle for existence is so keen among mankind that the inferior races tend to disappear unless they can adjust themselves to their new conditions. One of the few cases in which we can trace a probable degeneracy is that of the Bushmen of South Africa, who have suffered at the hands of Boers and Bechuanas.

With the help of history we can trace the advance of some races from one stage to the next. Thus the early history of the Celtic races, as we read it in the pages of Cæsar, shows us a distinctly barbaric stage which in contact with the Roman culture passes soon to a comparatively civilized form of social life. But by the very nature of the case we cannot expect to go behind the barbaric to

the savage stage of our own or similar communities, because we had already passed out of the savage stage when history began. Nevertheless we can trace survivals from prehistoric savagery not only into barbarism but even into civilization.

But even the slight traces of prehistoric times take on a meaning when we interpret them in the light of what we can see for ourselves. The distinction which may be presumed to hold between the different stages in a history of the same community, can be traced in the various communities of the living present. For example, the Australian Aborigines, the Zulus, the American Indians, the Chinese, the Dutch, constitute a scale of culture beginning from the lowest and going to the highest. Thus the inhabitants of the world to-day enable us to go with understanding right back into the past. The primitive race of to-day helps us to understand the primitive stages of culture of the more advanced races. For the customs and surroundings of the more primitive races are like the traces which have survived of the

customs and surroundings of more civilized stocks in earlier times. The Queen of the May in England represents for us a large body of customs and beliefs belonging not only to our own past but also to many other countries and times. The study of folklore, or as Vico called it 'vulgar wisdom,' began as an amusement and has ended as a science from which the most important conclusions can be drawn.

5. *Interpretation of Culture.*—In one respect primitive culture is easier to understand than the more advanced stages. For primitive culture exhibits human motives under simpler intellectual and economic conditions. But this very simplicity of conditions leaves the more scope for the unchecked working of an uncontrolled imagination. And from this uncontrolled imagination there arise the most intricate customs. The notion that the lives and the ideas of savages are simple is of considerable importance for sociology and politics. For many speculations, like those of Rousseau, from which such important results followed, are based upon

this erroneous idea. The error has been dissipated by more knowledge of savage customs. In the light of this complexity of savage life we can see how dangerous it is to isolate facts from the elaborate web of savage life. Miss Kingsley gives an amusing, and what should be a classic, instance of this danger. In her preface to Mr. Dennett's *Folklore of the Fjort*, she writes. 'Passing down a branch of the Karkola River in the Oroungou country in a canoe, with a choice band of natives for crew, we suddenly came upon a gentleman on the bank, who equally suddenly gave several dismal howls and fired at us with the scatter-gun prevalent in West Africa. . . . The poor man was merely suffering under domestic affliction. One of his wives had run away with a gentleman from a neighbouring village, and so he had been driven to fire at and attempt to kill a member of any canoe-crew from yet another village that might pass his way; because, according to the custom of the country, the men of this village would thereby have to join him in attacking the village of the man

who had stolen his wife. . . . This is only one instance out of many which I have come across, wherein it would be almost impossible for a person rapidly passing through a country to form a true opinion regarding a native custom.' But it is also dangerous to isolate facts nearer home. The other night I was in the saloon of the Theatre Royal, Nottingham, during the performance of a comic opera. With my mind full of the approaching end of things British, I was struck by four small young men standing at the bar drinking coffee. Such, I thought, is the reduction in height of the Anglo-Saxon race at its best. For the fact that these four young men were drinking coffee seemed to point to the serious turn of their minds, and to raise them above the beer-drinking majority. I communicated my melancholy to a friend. He replied that the four were jockeys, and so explained both their size and their temperate tastes. This example shows that there are opportunities enough of mistake quite close home, and may instil into our minds some of that caution in drawing con-

clusions which is rarely found in active students of sociology.

6. *Conflicting Reports of Observers.*—Now the very difficulty of describing accurately the condition of peoples who are at a low stage of culture has led to great differences between the accounts of different observers. It is notorious that till quite recently very few careful observations of savage and barbarous religions were accessible. The conflict of observers has compelled special attention to be given to the causes of the differences among them. Of course there is the personal equation to be reckoned with. But few persons are capable with Miss Kingsley of recognizing a possible acquaintance in a gentleman who fires at them with a scatter-gun. But apart from this gift of sympathy, it is or should be remembered that the hasty observation and the surface theories which disfigure the narratives of most historians and travellers are inevitable unless the observer first trains himself as best he can, and then spends long periods of time among the people

whom he wishes to study. Thus Livingstone tells us that 'in order to obtain an accurate knowledge of the (Bakwain) language I cut myself off from European society for about six months, and gained by this ordeal an insight into the habits, ways of thinking, laws and language of that section of the Bechuanas.' Miss Kingsley has already introduced us to another skilled observer of foreign customs in Mr. R. E. Dennett, who lived as a trader from 1878 to 1884 among the peoples of the Fjort (French Congo). Dr. W. H. Rivers is yet another kind of observer: this time a man with a thorough scientific equipment, and his book on the Todas is a valuable storehouse of facts.

7. *Descriptive Sociology*.—The improvements which have taken place in recording the circumstances of savage and barbaric life have influenced the records of civilized life. Herbert Spencer supervised the compiling of a *Descriptive Sociology*, in which the chief social facts of a great part of the world are enumerated. But the method

employed—abstracting from books of travel histories, etc.—is open to some objection. There is too little account taken of the fact that groups of observations lose some of their force if they are separated. Such collections as this should be regarded rather as indices than as descriptions.

When we pass to the great collections of facts relating to civilized societies, such as those of Mr. Charles Booth which deal with London, we must still be on our guard against misinterpretation of the facts thus assembled. In order to be available for our use as students of sociology, such collections must provide us with the necessary means of checking the statistics contained.

8. *Statistical Method.*—Now let us consider how we may turn these and similar assemblages of facts to scientific account. There is an art in dealing with figures. We shall do well therefore to gain practice by handling the leading figures in some simpler science, say in physics or chemistry, in order that we may be able to apply the

notions of a unit, a standard, a constant, and the like. Thus in chemistry 'taking into account the diverse properties of the elements we must have tables of the atomic weights, the specific heats, the specific gravities,' and so on. The sciences which are more closely concerned with man are becoming exact or quantitative with units, standards, and constants. Psychology has become experimental and quantitative in this way. How are we to set up units and standards in sociology?

9. *Unit and Standard*.—The most obvious unit is of course the individual human being. Every number larger than one implies the use of a unit—that is to say, that each is taken for one and not more than one. Sometimes the use of figures implies that the individuals are taken as equivalent parts of a larger unit. Thus the rank and file of one regiment are equivalent parts of a unit. But since human beings do not exactly resemble one another except within certain limits, the use of numbers is apt to be somewhat deceiving. We need, therefore,

to apply some standard, by which we may decide whether each unit is to count for one and no more. For some purposes we lump together vast numbers of individuals, merely counting them, as when we are taking a census or counting the rank and file of a regiment of a particular army. But for other purposes we cannot proceed in this way. If we are counting social forces, Shakespeare outweighs many minor dramatists, Lord Kelvin outweighs many minor physicists. So also in the moral world: one striking example such as that of Father Damien is more effective than many minor examples of self-sacrifice. But in the use of such standards of excellence, it is not meant that every one ought to conform to a given type of excellence. Very few persons are called to be dramatists or physicists. Not all persons are called to the lofty self-sacrifice of Father Damien. It is very important to be clear upon this point, because if we are not we shall fail to understand the fundamental principle of human justice. Justice is represented as

blind in order to show that she takes no account of persons. The student must be ready therefore to look away from all the special characteristics of human beings and to treat one man as equal to another. But when we pass from abstract justice to justice as expressed in the laws of the several states, we shall find that the attitude of justice is partly determined by the civil rights which are supposed to be attached to persons. For example, the alien in England is partly excluded from any share of citizenship and therefore from certain rights.

10. *Comparative Method.*—We have thus laid the foundation of what is called the comparative method. By this method we set objects side by side to discover how far they are alike, and then to consider how far their likenesses explain their main characteristics. We must first have accurate descriptions, and second, the common standards by which we may measure resemblances. Sometimes the states of contemporary societies are compared. The conditions of labour in England, Germany,

and the United States furnish a frequent subject of comparison. For this there is needed great accuracy in collecting the figures and great insight in securing that the conditions compared are of the same kind. Generally speaking, the conclusions drawn from such comparisons can only be relied on within narrow limits. It often turns out that careful examination leads us to distinguish between objects which we have hitherto regarded as alike. Thus the English monarchy is much more like the French Republic than it is like the Russian monarchy.

When we have thus determined the general resemblances and differences of societies, we can proceed to state them in the form of laws, and so contribute to the building up of the science of sociology. But we shall be more inclined to place reliance upon them if we can trace these laws to the fundamental principles of human nature. That is to say, we shall seek to exhibit these laws as following from or at least harmonious with the general laws of

perfection of structure and health or perfection of function), in wealth (under which we may include friendships), in ability, in virtue. Here are seven fundamental points of resemblance or difference as the case may be.

2. *Racial Differences*.—Along with racial differences there go a large number of secondary differences. Some of these are inevitably connected with differences of race. Thus the preference for certain forms over others is doubtless caused by the type of countenance which is characteristic of a race. The Japanese artist chooses by preference lines and contours which remind him of the Japanese types of beauty. Other differences which mark off a people of one race from a people of another race are not permanent, and tend to disappear when a given race is brought into contact with another race. For example, fashions in clothing are continually changing. All over the world dress is being slowly but steadily conformed to European usages.

The most impressive example of the way in which racial differences are regarded as

ultimate is to be found in the United States of America, where a large negro population is found side by side with a large Caucasian population. Neither a common religion nor a common citizenship can bridge over this difference to any great extent. The universal sentiment of the southern white is that the negro shall neither dominate politically nor shall he have social recognition. Mr. William Archer has recently travelled through the southern states, taking note of the contact of the white and negro populations. This acute observer comes to the conclusion that the only remedy for the present difficulties is the concentration of the negroes in a separate tract of land. There is a similar condition of affairs in South Africa.

Racial differences have expressed themselves in the constitution of certain societies under the form of caste. And the institution of castes has been justified, for example in India, by legends which have passed into the religious beliefs of the people. A racial supremacy which has been gained by conquest is thus consecrated as something

divinely ordained. This is due to the fact that the conquering race refuses to admit to its worship the members of another society. The distinction between the patricians and the plebeians in the Roman Republic closely resembles the present distinction of the Indian castes. Since marriage and burial are intimately associated with religious customs in all societies, it follows that racial difference, which usually carries with it difference of religious custom, involves a thoroughgoing separation of the individuals belonging to different races. This holds good of primitive times. It is curious at present that the English in India entertain towards the relatively civilized Hindus a feeling of racial difference scarcely less strong than that of the American to the negro.

3. *Differences between Man and Woman.*—One of the leading features of to-day is the attempt to make light of what may be called the secondary differences which hold between man and woman. Such an attempt robs human life in part of its main interest. For the differences between the sexes lead continually

to remote and unexpected consequences. There is, for example, a far wider range of variation among men both in physiological and in mental characteristics. Hence we may expect that those forms of genius which depend upon the excessive development of some one faculty will occur more frequently among men. And this is indeed the case. On the other hand, women respond to stimuli, psychic, or physical more readily than men. Hence they are more emotional, less independent than men. But along with this there go both good and evil consequences. 'The affectability of women,' says Havelock Ellis, 'exposes them to very diabolical manifestations.' It is also the source of very much that is most angelic in women: their impulses of tenderness, their compassion, their moods of divine childhood.' Since the range of variation is less in women than in men, it seems to follow that the typical woman is more near to the future, more near to that

¹ *Man and Woman*, p. 315. The reader should learn to discount the exaggerations of Mr. Ellis's school. Why 'diabolical'?

central direction along which the goal of humanity will be approached. The revolt of woman, therefore, which is of perpetual recurrence, is necessary in order to save society from being stereotyped. The greatest social problem of all is to create those institutions which shall provide adequate expression for all the differences which hold between the sexes.¹

4. *Childhood*.—The attention which is now being directed to the position of women is matched by the attention which since the time of Rousseau has been paid to the child. We ought to be concerned with the child not merely as the subject of an education which shall fit him for adult life, but as exhibiting physiological and mental qualities peculiar to childhood. Even more than in the case of woman must we look for the child's greater nearness to the median line of development. The child of to-day is nearer the man of the future than is the man of the present. I hope to deal with this whole subject in a separate

¹ See Ch. V, § 6 for some important factors which determine the position of women.

work. For the present purpose it is important to remember that the growing attraction which the child possesses may perhaps correct that limitation of the family which threatens the Caucasian races with extinction.

5 *Old Age*—And what are we to say of old age? Are we to dismiss it as meaningless in the scheme of things? Old age may be robbed of its meaning, as womanhood and childhood may be robbed of their meanings. But, in a well-ordered state of society, old age should appear as the fruition of the promise of manhood. Owing to the limitations of life, no man can unfold the whole of his powers or enjoy the whole of his possibilities. But in the later years he should be freed from some of the burdens of work, and so released from what cramps him in his vocation. Then with the accumulated knowledge of his life he can look out upon the world. He can give to the world that ripe wisdom which is only possible to old age.¹

6 *Fortune Physique*—Within the limits already marked out of race, of sex, and of age,

¹ Cf. *De Sen. et*, 11.

there are further differences which we may include under the two heads of physical and mental endowments, *fortune physique* and *fortune morale*.

In proceeding with our determination of the individual, we may consider him with reference to his health and stature and appearance: in a word, all that is expressed in the portraiture of a man.

It will be a comment upon the structure of society when we can answer the question how far the passing fashions of dress determine the effect of a portrait. No one who is familiar with the great painters will leave this last factor out of account. In the same way, the exterior setting, the wealth or poverty, amid which a human being lives, helps to determine his individuality. Only by an affected abstraction can we leave out of account these physical conditions of life.

7. *Fortune Morale*.—Over against those physical endowments or conditions of man are set his mental endowments—namely, his intellectual, moral, and emotional powers. It is not our business now to take up the whole

problem of psychology. It will be enough if for the moment we consider the special characters of the individual in these respects, so far as they determine the part which he will play in human society. The term ability is convenient here. Ability may be defined as the adaptation of a man to changes in his circumstances, or his power of controlling or using his circumstances. But even this does not exhaust the meaning of human life. The evolutionary school of sociologists often mislead the careless student here by leading him to think that adaptation to circumstances is everything. We must go beyond ability to the crowning and ultimate stage of individuality. We can speak of a man's physique, of his wealth, or poverty, of his ability. But behind all these is the one life which can never be fully explained by any outward circumstance or expression, and is beyond all external destiny. Even ability is only the superficial talent which advertises the man behind it. The superman of Nietzsche and Bernard Shaw is only a glorified talent.

8. *Classification of Individuals.*—The at-

tempt has been made sometimes to classify individuals according to their leading qualities. One of the most interesting of these attempts is that of Professor Giddings, who has distinguished human beings according to their health, their social qualities, their originality or inventiveness. By distinguishing further the high medium and defective grades of these qualities there is obtained a division into twenty-seven classes in all. Those who are curious to see how such a subdivision may be carried out will find it in *The Elements of Sociology*, pp. 105 ff.

9. *What does Genius mean?*—We shall leave on one side in our discussion all classes of persons except those who by their own endowment and by their adaptation to the circumstances in which they are placed exercise a considerable influence upon the general mind. If we take the word genius to stand for the qualities of the individual so far as he is an individual, and the word destiny to stand for the current of circumstances in which the individual finds himself, our formula will be genius and destiny. ‘Genius and good

fortune,' says a biographer of Napoleon, 'must go together to achieve great deeds' But there is a profound affinity between genius and destiny. 'To be on the spot when the opportunity for greatness occurs, this is the essential thing. When the hour and the man meet we call it fortune, but we should probably call it instinctive foresight if we could know how many alluring offers the man has refused, which would have led him where perhaps every advantage was to be found except the opportunity for greatness' (Seeley, *Life of Stein*, part i, chap. iv)

It is hard to hold the balance between the two parts of our formula, and the student will do well to test the authors whom he consults, according as they lay the more stress upon the individual or his circumstances. Some writers speak of the people or the democracy as if they were one body acting in a given direction. This is rarely the case. The action of the people or of the democracy is usually produced by an active minority, which claims to act in the name of the whole people. But at any given time only a small part of the people are

truly occupied in political affairs. It is the momentum of a few that carries the many along with them. Thus even the action of the whole community is reduced in the end to the action of a few. And in the study of history it is of the first importance to determine who constitute this nucleus. There is an element of illusion even. Those who respond to the lead of the few, think that they are acting of their own free will. But they make no real decision. Public opinion even yet is little more than a phrase. The excitement of political life consists in this: politics is a huge game played with men's lives and wealth for counters. Some day politics will be a business with the accounts properly audited, in such a way that the plain man can understand.

10. *Functions of Genius.*—The reader who is impatient with the end of the last paragraph is requested to reserve his judgment until he has considered the nature of genius itself. Perhaps we shall obtain a clue from the little world of man to the greater world of politics.

The richness of human life is not generally

comprehended even as things are: still less can we anticipate what the future may hold, not on the side of increased control of nature (this we shall consider in the next chapter), but on the side of man himself. By all analogy we are justified in expecting the continued revelation of the sons of God: new apostles of freedom like Moses and St. Paul. But it is not enough to be an apostle of freedom. There must be the promised land. And this is constituted by the human imagination for the most part, and only to a small extent by material things. If the wealth of the poets, thinkers, artists, discoverers, through all the ages were put into one scale, it would be found that they had turned it to enormous account. The extraordinary prices which people will now pay for what is really fine in the tradition of the past, enables us to understand what it has meant for the artist who with clearness has conceived his purpose, and with certainty has realized it. There is increasingly spread that enjoyment of works of art which consists on the one hand in the understanding of the artist's aim, and on the other in sympathy

with his efforts to attain that aim. To do the best work perfectly, that is genius.

How does man become so exquisite an instrument?

In the first place, each individual is separated from every other by an abyss. We only find our unity in God and in the love which is God. This is expressed by Swedenborg in the saying that angels are each of them a species. Now what has just been said in one way, may be said in a more technical way.

As we rise through the various orders of being, from the gaseous vapour to the crystal, from the crystal to the seaweed, and so on to the more complex forms of living beings, the differences between the individuals of each species become more important, until with humanity each individual is so far separate from his neighbour that he seems to be almost like separate species; or to put the same thought in a poetic manner, each individual is like a separate thought of God. This is the truth which is expressed by the saying: 'Now are we the sons of God.'

In the second place, the individual gains

influence very largely through the social order. The specialization of employments relieves each one very largely from those needs which in a less complex society must be satisfied by every man for himself. For example, the need of self-defence is met by the institution of police.

Not only, however, can the individual thus concentrate himself upon his employment but there is a further possibility. He can concentrate himself upon this or that part of his employment. The subdivision of labour gives us a crude symbol of what can take place in each individual mind. The artist who is painting a portrait will first draw upon his memory and invention for the pose which shall be truest the subject before him. When he has planned out his picture, he will devote himself to seizing the characteristic expression which shall constitute the portrait. Natural endowment and repeated practice will enable him to leave the accurate representation of the forms and colours before him to the skilled eye and hand. Relying upon these, he can watch for the shades of glance or gesture to which his

artist's soul responds. He need not toil laboriously after a mere transference of what he sees to the canvas. He can exercise that selection which is the secret of success, and in so doing he will leave but few traces of the effort which underlies even the most brilliant improvisation. This is what is meant by touch. The artist concentrates himself upon the problem of the moment, knowing all the time that he can rely upon a painfully acquired skill to carry out all but the immediate and unprecedented details. To these he devotes himself, and the result in the case of genius is a masterpiece. The emphasis, the omission, which separates the first-rate from the second-rate, is but slight as compared with the whole undertaking. But since the characteristic exercise of genius is found in this same emphasis and omission, we shall be able to distinguish genius from the absence of it rather more easily than at first sight appears. Perhaps translation from one language into another will furnish another useful illustration. The words and their meanings, the order of them and their purpose, are understood by the

intelligent student. But the finest poetry and prose is impossible of adequate translation. Goethe's *Ueber allen Gipfeln ist Ruh* remains for ever a German possession, because the beauty of these lines can never be wholly transferred to another language. On the other hand, Fitzgerald's translation of *Omar Khayyam* shows us how the touch of a translator upon material which falls short by a little of the highest, can lift it over the last interval.

Now in the light of these familiar instances it should be possible to define genius in other quarters. In the matter of patents, genius is not less shown in the last transformation of a method which renders it widely available than in the first beginnings. In a word, genius works upon the margin which separates the known from the unknown, the already done from the possible future, the tradition from the inspiration which nobly embodies the desires of a people. Hence genius is always surprising those who are merely content with the past.

The importance of this interpretation of

genius to sociology is nowhere more clearly seen than in the study of the art of war. 'Strategy,' says Colonel Henderson, 'is an art which almost more than any other is concerned with the fate of nations.' Here, above all, genius works at the margin. 'The only right way of learning the science of war is to read and re-read the campaigns of the great captains.' This maxim of Napoleon shows how his mind worked on the boundary line between the tried and the untried: how each problem came before him already partially solved, so that he could concentrate himself upon the unsolved parts of the problem. Our national lack of system means that genius has to devote itself to details which ought to be delegated to others, and cripples our commanders, so that they usually fight at a disadvantage. The importance of military genius consists in this, that 'although outnumbered on the whole, the general is superior to his enemy at the decisive point.' But in order that he may exercise this superiority he must be supported by organization and well-trained subordinates.

✍ In political life also the genius is he who, surveying the whole field, concentrates his powers upon just those undertakings which are both possible and desirable. The analogy between the conflict of parties and the conflict of nations is a very close one. 'Every power has a tendency to push on until a barrier is raised from without against its advance.' The statesman in opposition will not dissipate his energies in merely resisting the measures to which superior numbers give the colour of justice. He will seek to express those human needs to which the party in power cannot promise satisfaction, and will offer battle in their behalf.

11. *Imitation of Genius.*—Along with the inexplicable and admirable occurrence of genius there goes the readiness of mankind to follow a lead. This readiness of itself helps to constitute that destiny without which genius loses half its brilliance.¹ The instinct towards a leader finds a curious and characteristic expression in what is called fashion. By this I do not mean the passing manner

of dress, but that general standard of behaviour and preference which is current among a given society at any one time. If, on the one hand, genius works sometimes in solitude, on the other, for lack of an object, the tendency to follow a lead exhausts itself in those fantastic rules and compliances which make up social custom, and are symbolized in the figures and movements of the more set dances, such as a minuet or a quadrille. The changing colours of social life are thus the background of the picture which is drawn by genius upon the page of human history. What the best-dressed and most elegant personages are for the crowd, that in each special sphere are the best-equipped individuals for their fellow-workers.

12. *Genius and Sects.*—In this way the concurrence of genius tends to form a school of practice or of thought, a party or a sect. But such an event cannot come about unless there be found individuals with a genius for friendship, or round whom a group of persons may gather. The importance of Dr. Johnson consists almost more in the influence which

he exerted upon the members of his circle, than in the good sense and good morals which are the commonplace, but in their combination rare, characteristics of his writings.

13. *Interval between Thought and Accomplishment.*—As the years pass, what was once at the margin becomes the general property of mankind. The period that elapses between the margin and arrival at the central point is usually not far from forty years. For this is the interval which separates impressionable youth—a stage closed about the twenty-sixth year—from the time of the grand climacteric, when the influence of a man is at its greatest.

14. *Illustrations*—Forty years, therefore, is the period which usually separates the origin and the effective operation of new ideas or purposes. For example, the public feeling which made the Reform legislation of 1832 possible in England, can best be understood if we consider who was writing or speaking about the year 1792. Dr. Priestley, Gilbert Wakefield, Dr. Price, Robert Hall, and Thomas Paine prepared the minds of

the English people for those measures of legislative change which connected the new with the old. These names are not as great as that of Burke, but their bearers were men who could see deeper into the nature of things than Burke. They stood upon the margin. Burke retreated into the evanescent past. And when historical justice is done to the unpopular opposition of those days, it will be found that these men were deficient neither in eloquence nor in political wisdom.

Nor did they lack their prophet. Among those who met in bookseller Johnson's shop was William Blake, who already ten years before had written the magical piece beginning, 'Whether on Ida's shady brow.' Blake was afire in the dawn of liberty. Half the secrets of his prophetic poems disclose themselves when we remember this. Some of his recent editors might have taken the hint which Blake gives in his 'Proverbs of Hell': 'Eternity is in love with the productions of time.' Let the 'America,' which was published in 1793, be read along with 'A Song of Liberty' by some one who remembers Blake's

sympathy with the revolutionary movement, and they will be understood better.

15. *Genius and Action.*—The principle which has been laid down that genius carries with it an application to the circumstances of its environment, enables us to sweep on one side a heap of nonsense that is cloaked under the name of idealism. Plato himself cannot be understood apart from the history of real events. His system of ideas takes most of its life from the Athens upon which it is the commentary. Nor would he have been invited to Sicily if his thought had been as widely separated from reality as it is the fashion to make out. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are profoundly occupied with politics. They all lived upon the boundary that separates and unites the essential present and the purposed future.

This relation of genius to its circumstances is the key, therefore, to the understanding of human history. It must not be confined to the thinkers of genius. A similar relation holds not only for the poets, the artists, the writers, but for the world of practice. The

preacher of religion, the statesman, the social reformer in all his shapes, will be tested by their power of uniting a past which is worth keeping to a future which is worth making.¹

¹ I have discussed this topic in the *Hilbert Journal*, July 1910, in reviewing Eucken's *Problem of Life*.

CHAPTER IV

LEISURE AS A CONDITION OF WORK

1. *What does Leisure mean?*—The kind of leisure which is here treated of, is not that which is spent under summer skies, but the leisure which comes in the long winter evenings.

It is the custom to quote Lord Bacon as saying that 'Man is the servant and interpreter of nature.' Unfortunately those who quote him leave out his parallel saying: 'Nature is subdued by submission.' Man is at first merely the subject of her laws; then he learns to control them for his own purposes. Now the control of nature for the purposes of man, leads to one result of which the importance is scarcely recognized. The increased control of nature leads to more leisure;

that is to say, man is able to work out his own special purposes for a certain amount of time. Now leisure, in this sense, is generally treated as if it were merely an opportunity for pastimes. I propose to treat leisure from another standpoint ; to examine what happens when leisure is used by the individual for his own purposes, other than mere amusement.

In order to understand the use of leisure, it will be necessary to take a brief but comprehensive survey of two matters : first, the gradual use of tools by which man came to control nature ; second, the successive rise of occupations by which he came to spend his time in various ways. Now throughout this survey we must remember that science is both a means to the more efficient use of mechanical resources, and it is also a mode of passing the time. Unless there had been persons who chose this kind of occupation, there would have been no science. Language itself bears witness to this. The Greek word *scholē* first meant leisure ; then it meant that in which leisure was occupied, a serious discussion ; then it meant a place in which persons met

for this purpose. Thus out of the leisure of the Greeks there arose the whole procedure of education as well as of science. The close association of these two—shall we say?—pastimes, will meet us again at the end of our inquiry.

2. *Resources of Man in his Conflict with Nature.*—And first as to the resources of man for the subjugation of nature. In comparison with the forces which are at work about him, he seems almost impotent. But by the use of tools and by co operation he is enabled at will to bring forces to bear at any given point that are many times greater than his own unaided powers.

There is a curious circumstance which attends the use of tools. By practice the artisan becomes so sensitive to the behaviour of his implements, that his susceptibility, his consciousness, seems to be extended to the furthest point of the stone or metal or other material which he is using.

By another curious law of human nature, persons who work together gradually acquire so close a sympathy that they seem almost to

share the same consciousness. In this manner the sensitiveness of genius is, so to speak, multiplied. We must bear this in mind when in a few moments we go on to consider the working of capital.

Now here we have two distinct lines of movement. On the one hand there is the gradual elaboration of man's implements: on the other hand there is the gradual development of his occupations. In order to understand these two lines of change we shall take a general survey, first of the successive materials used by man for his tools—stone, bronze, iron: and then of the succession of primitive occupations. Apart from the circumstance that these successions continue up to the present, the facts are of so simple a character that they are a useful introduction to the subject. The reader from his own knowledge or imagination may fill in the bare outlines which are here presented.

3. *Archæological Clues to Primitive History.*
—By the help of archæology and history, and by the study of contemporary primitive forms of culture, we can understand man's increasing

control over nature. The anthropologist marks off the successive stages of advancing civilization, as man passes from the use of rough stones and weapons to polished stones, and again from stone to metal, first to bronze, and then from bronze to iron. Our measure of time is very different from that of the historian, who is helped by definite records. Instead of years we deal with geological periods and with ages of culture. We have to be satisfied with a bare register of succession: with saying that such and such objects come before or at the same time with or after other objects. Moreover, the stages of development overlap. Notably is this the case as man passes from the use of stone to the use of metals. The finest stone tools were wrought at a time when man had already become familiar with the working of bronze.¹

4. Bronze and Iron Ages.—The date at which various civilizations have passed from the use of stone to that of bronze, and from the use of bronze to that of iron, varies with each civilization. 'At present the piece of

¹ *Antiquities of Egypt*, vol. i. 123.

bronze for which the highest antiquity is claimed, is the rod found at Medum in Egypt (c. 3700 B.C.).¹

But we must not suppose that there was ever a general bronze age. For example, when the Australians were discovered they were without any knowledge of the use of metals. The continent of America furnishes the most striking example. 'Throughout the whole northern regions of the North American continent, in the West Indies, and in parts of South America, a population was found by the first European invaders which consisted exclusively of rude nomad hunters, in a pure stone period of primitive savage art.'

'But wholly distinct from its rude Indian tribes, North America had its semi-civilized Mexicans, and South America its more highly civilized Peruvians, who had learned to mine and smelt the ores of the Andes, and to make metallic alloys wherewith to fashion for themselves bronze tools of requisite hardness for quarrying and hewing the solid rock. With

¹ *Brit. Mus. Guide, Bronze Age*, p. 9.

these they sculptured the statues of their gods, and reared palaces, temples, and pyramids, graven with elaborate sculptures and hieroglyphics¹

Some experience must have been acquired in earlier metallurgy before iron ore was attempted to be wrought. The date, however, at which iron was first worked is by no means determined. But there is nothing in the actual working of iron that necessitates a late date in the history of civilization²

5. *Primitive Occupations* — Alongside with the subdivision of prehistoric times, according to the material of which weapons and implements were made, there goes the division of historic periods distinguished by occupations, into the age of the hunter, the shepherd, the tiller of the ground and the craftsman. Just as the stages of culture which are measured by stone, bronze, or iron, through which civilized nations have passed, can be seen to-day among less civilized contemporary communities, so is it with these other stages.

¹ *For. Inst.*, p. 321.

² *For. Inst.*, p. 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

There are peoples who live mainly by hunting : there are people who wander with their flocks from place to place.

Thus 'the Bushmen of South Africa live mainly upon game. They follow their herds as they migrate with the changes of the rainy season, and kill what they want with their poisoned arrows. When large game fails, the people live on locusts and the bodies and eggs of white ants.'¹ The Eskimo subsists mainly by fishing, but recent explorations have disclosed several inland tribes who live by hunting. It was a great advance in civilization when animals were domesticated. Instead of wandering after game, the nomad races wandered with their flocks and herds in search of pasture. 'At the present time the Kara Kirghiz, or Black Cossacks who inhabit Turkestan, live in tent villages. In the summer they occupy the higher slopes of the mountains, where pasture can be found : in winter they descend to the valleys.'² In 1857, General Gordon described in some of his letters the similar life which is led by the

¹ *Living Races of Mankind*, p. 269. ² *Op. cit.* p. 218.

Kurds under the nominal Turkish suzerainty. 'We met on our road a great number of Kurds, who live as their fathers did, by travelling about, robbing, etc., with their flocks. They never live in houses, but prefer tents and caves.'

6. *Transitional Occupations* — It is well to remind ourselves from time to time that our own industrial organization does not exhaust all the possibilities of life, and that it is probably not the final form of organization. Perhaps the most important change that ever took place in this respect was the transition from a wandering to a settled life from hunting to agriculture. Compared with the nomad, the man who tills the ground is a craftsman. Hence, in estimating the relative parts which are played by different occupations in the development of the human race, we must not fall into the error of separating farming too widely from the industries which are usually pursued in towns. The farm labourer is an artisan whose work is inadequately recognized. The comparative novelty of machinery and technical processes has produced certain

illusions from which it is time that we were freed. The application of machinery and of chemical discoveries to farming render farming not the least, but the most, conspicuous example of the conflict of man with nature and of his progressive victories over her.

7. *Capital and Humanism.* — With this consideration in our minds we may go on to observe the relation of capital to science and to humanism. The reader has perhaps overlooked the definition of capital which was implied in the opening sentences of this chapter. 'By the use of tools and by co-operation, man is enabled to bring forces to bear, at any given point, that are many times greater than his own unaided powers.' Now the use of money in measuring capital is to afford a convenient common denominator, by which we can compare in some degree things which in themselves are widely different. For the moment, instead of money as the measure of capital, we shall take the power which capital gives us over nature. It is because nature is so generous in her return for human labour, that she offers the rewards which

induce men to abstain and to save for the sake of future profit.

✓ The increase of capital, that is to say, the increase of man's control over nature, consists partly in man's willingness to co-operate, partly in the power of individuals to organize and control the labours of others, partly in mechanical and other inventions. Now it is only in this last respect that science immediately contributes to man's control over nature. For example, the electric telegraph, and, later, the telephone, have replaced the sending of messengers or the interviews of persons who are engaged in business: that is to say, these inventions have reduced the importance of separation in space. Now it is not enough to consider the immediate effects of the changes which are thus brought into human life. It is not enough to note the fact that by the telegraph and the telephone we are enabled almost to disregard the spaces which separate us; we must also note the effect which the increase of our control over nature, through science and invention, has upon the other two factors, namely, the co-

operation of individuals and the control through individuals. We shall find that the telephone has undoubtedly laid a heavier burden upon those persons who control and organize the labours of others. A man sitting in his room with a telephone at his side can carry out more projects in a given time than if he had to traverse the streets, or the other forms of interval, which sever him from the parties to his concerns. The concentration of work upon a smaller space of time, and the consequent increase of strain, have caused, or helped to cause, the not infrequent failures of health or power which mark contemporary public life. At the same time, these changed conditions have lessened the number of untried persons whose abilities are equal to the control of business and other affairs. The diminution of the number of individual concerns, which is so marked a feature of the present day, is due not only to the change of non-human conditions, such as simplification and economy of production and distribution, but also to the more severe demands which are made upon those who have to put into

exercise this same simplification and economy. There is comparatively little competition for the most important functions. The persons who can fulfil them are less numerous proportionately than when we descend to the more common functions. But even here the increasing complexity of machinery demands increased knowledge, increased power of attention from the workmen whose labours are too often regarded as mechanical. The division of labour certainly assigns to many the monotonous repetition of single actions, or small groups of actions. This is especially the case with industries in which many similar objects are produced at the same time. But the growing complexity of mechanical and chemical processes demands greater intelligence from those who, so to speak, are at the ganglia of the commercial organism. The same change is perhaps seen most clearly in the greater scope which modern conditions of warfare offer to the initiative of the individual. The warfare of the future will call for intelligent reconnoitring almost above everything else, and the success or

failure of a campaign may turn, as at Magersfontein, upon mistakes made by a few individuals in carrying out reconnoitring. It is questionable, therefore, whether the application of science to practical problems will simplify human life quite in the way which is taken for granted, both by those who uphold and by those who attack our present social organization.

In the next place, the dislocation of social life, which is produced by mechanical inventions and the consequent increase of man's control over nature, affects groups of individuals. Persons who have fitted themselves for one kind of function are thrown out of employment, or left with diminished and often insufficient incomes. The classical case of this is of course the industrial revolution, which, roughly speaking, may be said in England to have filled the reign of George the Third. The hardships which were inflicted upon large numbers by this revolution furnished Marx with the material upon which he based *Das Kapital*. It is too often overlooked, however, that the hardships

of this revolution would have probably been considerably lightened by legislation,¹ had it not been for the occurrence of the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon. For many years England was engaged in war, in such a way that the demand for reform could be represented as anti-patriotic. Hence the party in power could maintain corn at an exorbitant price, while the rising class of manufacturers kept wages on the nicely balanced interval which separates actual from possible starvation. The Luddites who destroyed the machinery which competed with domestic industries, were only justified in part when they regarded machinery as their enemy. The arguments of Marx and his school in like manner fall largely to the ground because they isolate a particular aspect of capital, and neglect its historical setting. Capital cannot be understood by persons who overlook the human factors, readiness to co-operate and power to control.

✓ 8. *New Social Equilibrium*.—There are signs, however, that in the most progressive

¹ A Factory Act was passed in 1802.

countries a new social equilibrium is being attained. The most important feature of this new state of things is the increased leisure which falls to those whom we may call the non-combatants in the strife with nature. Those, indeed, who are responsible for the guidance and the control of the several parts of the industrial organization, carry their work with them into what seem unoccupied hours. But there are large numbers of persons who turn their leisure to account in a way that does not immediately concern their daily occupation. In this sense many of the working classes have the most leisure for self-improvement. To them it is a wholesome change to pass from the bench or the mine, to economical, historical, or even literary studies. In conjunction with the centres of university education which have sprung up in the last twenty years, the Workers' Educational Association has almost realized in England the prophecy made some years ago by Lord Avebury, that the working man would be of all men the best able to cultivate his intelligence.

To him study may come as a recreation, while his daily work affords him sufficient physical exercise.

✓ 9. *Leisure and Capital*.—How will this increase of leisure affect the application of capital? In the first place, the workman with his diminished hours of work should be better able to engage upon his particular function. In the second place—and this is more important—in his leisure he may train himself to fulfil those more difficult duties of which something was said some time since. Now these more difficult duties may either be concerned with his own trade, or with the administration in various forms of public business. The working man may rise to be a foreman and then to be a manager: or he may rise from being a committeeman of his society to the secretaryship, and ultimately to Parliament. Such are the opportunities which present themselves to the individual, owing to the increase of leisure and of freedom. Cobden is an example of what could take place among the middle classes. The Labour benches

in the House of Commons show what is now taking place among the working classes. But we must not make the mistake of thinking that under modern industrial conditions men can rise from one position to another only in the world of politics. For one working man who rises to political eminence, there are probably at least fifty who rise in the hierarchy of business to wealth and consideration. Thus the lessening of the hours of labour and the improvement of the means of education are perpetually enlarging the classes who are economically independent. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the tendency to concentrate some undertakings in the hands of the State will overtake the tendency of the individual to originate some undertakings, and to develop others in a quite independent way.

10. *Economic Freedom a means to an end.*—But the control of the physical environment, however complete it may become, is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end, namely, human life; and human life in

its most perfect form. Economic freedom, therefore, is not an end in itself. It is the means to spiritual freedom, and not always the indispensable means. To speak, therefore, of technical education is an inaccuracy, if we mean by education the development of man's whole nature. We should speak more correctly if we said technical instruction. And by this we should mean instruction which treated the knowledge of the individual as a means to the greater perfection of trade processes. To establish technical instruction, therefore, as the crown of elementary and secondary education, is to reduce life to something unworthy of man's calling. It is a treachery to the power which has made us what we are.

✓ The purpose which is served by our increased control of nature is the extension of our leisure that we may have time for contemplation. To pass through the successive stages of life without one pause, is to imitate the traveller in a beautiful country who never takes note of his surroundings. The lapse of time has introduced Ruskin's

works to those who can only purchase cheap reprints. Hence I can appeal to a large proportion of readers. They will find that the greatest service that Ruskin has rendered to them and their like, is in guiding to a right thankfulness for leisure, and to resolutions for its better use.¹

11. *Increased Leisure of Women.*—The increased control of nature has been considered up to now as if it concerned one sex alone. But our work is only half done. There are large numbers of women with leisure which they have not yet learned to turn to full account. And these numbers will be increased when an improved organization of business frees women from many industries for which they are not fitted. In the first flush of possession, many women treat leisure as if it were an end in itself, and shun every duty which threatens to occupy their time and energies. But this is probably a transient state of things. To make leisure subservient merely to change and excitement is no longer the practice of the better class of working

¹ *Modern Painters*, part iii. sec. i. chap. i.

men. And, by analogy, it will be found that women will also turn their leisure to good account.

Like many working men, some women have directed their leisure to the improvement of their position in the economic world. There are many businesses which owe their success to the actual participation, or else the inspiration and advice, of women. By analogy, also, it may be argued that the number of women for whom business thus affords opportunities is much larger than the number who may reasonably concern themselves with politics. And this is indeed the case. A social revolution is already half accomplished. To take one instance among many, the part which is played by women in education is already greater in England than that which is played by men. For the education of the child up to the seventh year is almost exclusively in the hands of women. And after that age, at least half the instruction in the country is given by women teachers. Only experience can disclose how far the intervention of women in the other professions will go.

12. *Leisure as the Basis of Social Enjoyment.*—In the society of which we have been forecasting the lineaments, the increased leisure will be enjoyed in common by men and women. It is this common leisure which has given its charm to the aristocratic societies of the past and present. And now such life is about to be made a general possession throughout the most progressive nations. But this delightful result can only be entirely attained when women enter with disciplined minds upon the high interests which should occupy us all at times. Those studies which cultivate a sense of justice; a freedom from undue prejudice; a readiness to consider, if not to accept, new ideas—must be at the call of women no less than of men. Participation in the simplest forms of amusement need not exclude the reasoned interest in politics, the cultivation of a balanced judgment in matters of conduct, the susceptibility to what is really beautiful. And the most efficient instruments for these things are the studies of which the Universities are at once the symbols and the guardians.

There is therefore a special summons to women not merely to take their part in social work which is directed to removing economic troubles : they are also recipients of a spiritual call to share with men the intellectual inheritance of the ages. Whether in this new world the form of society is socialist or individualist ; whether the form of government is directly or indirectly representative ; all will turn upon the free movement of individuals who, in ways unforeseen as yet, will control economic forces by a spiritual authority.

CHAPTER V

THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE

1. *The Family as the Unit of Social Life.*

—The family, and not the individual, is the unit upon which society is built. The decline of the family marks the decline of a race, and those forces which make for the decline of the family are dangerous above all others from the standpoint of the sociologist. These propositions which represent the traditional view are probably nearer the truth than the changing hypotheses about the family which anthropologists have from time to time developed from imperfectly observed facts.

On no subject, therefore, is it more important for the sociologist to employ a correct method. And there is hardly a more difficult task. Hence the fiercest controversies still

are raging. Students who have occupied themselves with human origins, have argued back from certain social institutions, and especially from apparent survivals of custom, to the supposed primitive conditions of mankind. They have then proceeded to formulate hypotheses which sometimes have been widely received. Nevertheless, tradition is probably a better guide.

2. *The Family and Childhood.*—The institution of the family is closely associated with the weakness of childhood. In those parts of the world, and among those races in which maturity is soonest reached, the child needs the guidance and protection of its elders for at least ten or twelve years. It is on this fact that marriage is largely based. The experience of mankind has shown that those tribes in which the marriage of one man with one woman—monogamy—is the custom, are, generally speaking, the tribes which are the best fitted to survive. And the reason is that the children are best cared for under this system. In this sense the family has not developed. From the earliest times there

have been families in which the children grew up under the control of a single pair. And it will be safer to treat this case as the usual one, and to mark off the divergencies from it and try to explain them.

If this hypothesis be true, it must probably be connected with the widespread ancestor worship which is found not only in classical antiquity, but is still a mighty force in China and Japan. Ancestor worship provided a religious sanction for the duties which arise out of family relationships.¹ Hence ancestor worship has been a source of national strength. Ancestor worship was practised in Israel until historical times, and paved the way to the family, regarded more generally as a society of worship. The God of Abraham was certainly a god of a family.

3. *Communal Marriage*.—As against the view already maintained, it has been asserted that there was a time when, within the limits of the same tribe or horde, all the men and women in the community were regarded as husbands and wives one to another. To this

¹ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, ii. 133 ff.

state of things Lord Avebury has given the name of 'communal marriage.' The children would therefore be regarded as children of the whole community. Such a hypothesis, for it is nothing more, breaks down at once when we observe the universality and strength of the parental instinct.¹

The evidence for the communal hypothesis is based upon the statements of ancient writers and modern travellers, that certain savage nations live in a state of promiscuity. It is also said that in more civilized nations there are relics of ancient customs which have come down from a time when in an earlier state of culture marriage did not exist. But if such statements, repeated on the authority of modern travellers, have been examined, the exact contrary is found to be the case. For example, Bushmen are said by Lord Avebury to be entirely without marriage. But this is incorrect. For in some sections of the race there is a definite marriage ceremony. Again, the Veddahs of Ceylon are among the most backward of all races, and

¹ M'Dougall, *Social Psychology*, chap. 11.

might be expected to show no trace of marriage customs. But they are truly monogamous, and have a saying that 'death alone separates husband and wife.'¹

Since the parental instinct is the source of many virtues, it is important for the moral history of mankind that family life is a primitive fact.

4. *Primitive Morality*.—Here, as elsewhere, there is a marked tendency to exaggerate the immorality of primitive peoples. Without returning to the theory of the 'noble savage,' it should yet be possible to do justice to the good qualities of the negro and the Kaffir. Where immoral conditions prevail, they are in many cases due to the contact of a lower with a higher culture, or, as Westermarck says, with the dregs of it. It is to be noticed that the higher culture generally presents itself to the lower, as based upon great power over nature and without any moral meaning. Whatever be the cause, the effects are usually bad. In Greenland, according to Dr. Nansen, 'the Eskimo women of the larger colonies

¹ Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, p. 60.

are far freer in their ways than those of the small outlying colonies where there are no Europeans.' Speaking of the tribes who once inhabited the Adelaide plains of South Australia, Mr. Edward Stephens, who went to Australia about half a century ago, says : 'Those who speak of the native as a naturally degraded race, either do not speak from experience, or they judge them by what they have become when the abuse of intoxicants and contact with the most wicked of the white race have done their deadly work.'¹

This tendency to underestimate the moral qualities not only of savage tribes but even of civilized peoples, is encouraged by some missionaries, and not a few members of superior races who try to put an educational colour upon their occupation of foreign lands. But there are striking instances of high virtues displayed by savages which should make us hesitate. For example, Livingstone's native attendants displayed the most touching loyalty even after his death, carrying his dead body and his possessions faithfully to

¹ Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, p. 60.

the coast in order to hand them over to the British consul.

5. *Evidence from Names of Relationships.*—It thus appears that upon examination the evidence from the narratives of travellers breaks down when it is alleged, first, as showing that in primitive human life there was no regular marriage, and incidentally as showing that primitive man is almost without a moral sense. It is sometimes said, however, that the names of relationships afford evidence of communal marriage. There are cases where the men of the same generation call themselves brothers and sisters: the men and women of the older generation are called fathers and mothers: the boys and girls are called sons and daughters. But here again a more careful examination of the facts shows that the names of relationships do not prove the existence of the communal marriage or of the absence of marriage. Thus the Eskimo, although they are at a very low degree of culture, have a far more correct system of naming than many other races.¹

¹ Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, p. 84.

6. *Matriarchy*.—We may therefore neglect as an unfounded hypothesis the theory that man, speaking generally, ever lived in hordes. Hence, as Vico pointed out, we must regard marriage as one of the primitive institutions of mankind. There are two groups of marriage customs: those, namely, who treat the woman as the centre of the family, and those which make the man the centre of the family. It is unfortunate that the term matriarchy was used for the former case where the woman is the centre. Matriarchy suggests headship, and it does not follow that woman was the head of the family, even if relationship was counted on the mother's side.

There is not even any complete antagonism between these two views. It is only in appearance that the two groups of customs seem to be exclusive. In practice they blend, or at least exist, side by side. Their effects upon other customs and moral ideas are closely interwoven. It is probably impossible to determine which of these two groups of customs are historically prior. But, as Wundt says, 'it is enough for our present

purpose to recognize that the motives from which the two ideas rose are originally parallel factors in the shaping of society.'¹

Some of the causes of the prominence of women may be mentioned. Where the husband is away from the home for long periods, the wife has to protect the dwelling and see after the children. There is no need, however, to go far afield for such obvious facts of human life. The well-tended home and children of the thrifty housewife in a big city, or the slut with her arms akimbo gossiping with her like-minded neighbours amid a crowd of dirty undisciplined children, are as instructive for the sociologist as the observation of similar contrasts in an African village. Many writers, however, attribute to women indiscriminately those services to the race which are only performed by a few. It is probable that women were the first to cultivate various wild plants round the dwelling, and to tame the milder wild animals. Yet it was not to all women that the beginnings of pastoral life and of agriculture were due, but to some one

¹ Wundt, *Facts of the Moral Life*, p. 232.

with eager mind here or there. In a similar way it has been maintained, and on similar grounds, that women were the inventors of weaving. But inventions are never made by general assemblages. Again we must think of the individual. All honour to the unknown housewives throughout the ages, each in their several homes, who by their inventions have thus been the mothers of the race. Let us think of them as the mother goddesses: Demeter of Eleusis, or Our Lady of Chartres, whom in pre-Christian times the Druids worshipped, or the deep-bosomed figures of the pediment of the Parthenon whom Time has deprived of their heads, so that they come before us with veiled personalities. Let us again bid farewell to the superficial generalizations. Man neither lived in hordes nor mated indiscriminately, nor invented by public meeting. Divine motherhood and home and inspiration are older than history itself.

Some have even said that woman was the first priest, tending the fire on the hearth during her husband's absence, and therefore providing the daily sacrifice. She guarded

in her memory the ritual of the gods of the household, and by telling the legends of the past to her children became the muse of history ; or, as she crooned the old songs, walked the earth as the muse of song.

It is interesting to note that the deities of the home are goddesses, Hestia, Vesta, Freya. Another circumstance which should not be overlooked, is the power of magic and prophecy which in so many cases is regarded as the property of women. It is in this spirit that Tacitus remarks of the ancient Germans, that ' they think there is in women a sacred prophetic principle, and they neither despise their opinions nor neglect their answers.'¹

From this belief in the divine qualities of women there rose in the mediæval world, so far as it came under the domination of Christian belief, the romantic idea of marriage. If we wish to understand how matriarchy, in the sense of the headship of women, arose, we must turn to the institution of chivalry.²

¹ *Germania*, 8.

² Sir Edward Strachey, preface to *Morte d'Arthur* (Macmillan).

The Teutonic reverence for women blended with the worship of the Virgin Mary, and gave its especial colour to the exalted gallantry which from an early time was found not only in the pages of the chroniclers but in mediæval life. A further piece of evidence which carries us right back beyond the Middle Ages to the earliest Aryan civilizations consists in the pairs of deities, god and goddess, which seem to rule the later pantheons. Zeus and Hera in Greece, Jupiter and Juno in Latium, Dyaus-pita and Prithivi (Father heaven and Mother earth) in India, doubtless mirrored the earliest usages of their worshippers, and may represent to us the high position of the consort of the earthly representatives of the king of the gods. Even before the Teutonic instances of romantic affection existed, the position of woman was one of equality with the man. Hence marriage is defined by the Roman legist *Modestinus*: 'Consortium omnis vitæ, divini et humani iuris communicatio,' that is to say, 'Fellowship throughout life, participation in rights human and divine.' Thus we see that along

with the physical weakness of woman, which explains her inferior position among some primitive nations, there go attributes of mind which lead up to and explain her social and economic equality elsewhere. Some readers may be surprised that no generalization has been attempted upon this topic of matriarchy. But it is well to remind ourselves once more that owing to the unfathomable depths of the human personality and to the incalculable effects of leadership upon a group of persons, we must turn not to logic but to the history of the past in order to understand the present. Hence the account which has been given of matriarchy is based rather upon tradition than upon the synthesis which to Mr. Spencer seemed to promise so much, but in fact has yielded so little.¹

7. *Patriarchy*.—Let us now pass to the position of the man in the family. We must not be misled by those exceptional cases where the woman seems to have been the centre of the family life. 'Even where succession runs through females only, the father

¹ *Supra*, Ch. I, § 8.

is nearly always certainly the head of the family.'¹ In this way we avoid being led away by the grotesque suppositions which have been invented to explain obvious facts in the history of the family. It is almost a canon of investigation in this direction that the superficial differences of mankind unduly conceal the great tendencies of human history.

There is no adequate evidence that in some definite stage of human history woman was the head of the family.

We may now proceed to the patriarchal family: 'a group of men and women, children and slaves, of animate and inanimate property, all grouped together by common subjection to the paternal power of the chief of the household.'² In many cases the authority of the chief was sustained by ancestor worship. When Confucius was asked what was meant by the obedience of a son, he replied: 'To serve our parents with courtesy whilst they live, to bury them with all courtesy when they die, and to worship

¹ Westermarck, *Hum. in Marriage*, p. 41.

² Ma te, *Village Communities*, p. 15.

them with all courtesy.'¹ The case is similar with Japan.

Patriarchy can be carried back to primitive times, not only among the Aryan, but among the Semitic nations. The ancient family was both wider and narrower than the modern. For the ancient family admitted fresh members by adoption and by purchase : so that the wife and the slave in their different degree were added to it. On the other hand, the women of the family who were sold into marriage, no longer belonged to the family. 'No feature of the rudimentary associations of mankind is deposed to by a greater amount of evidence than this, and yet none seems to have disappeared so generally and so rapidly from the uses of advancing communities.'²

With the considerations that have thus been laid before him, the student is probably better equipped to understand the controversies which still rage round the origin of the human family.

¹ *Sayings*, ii. 5.

² Maine, *Ancient Law*, p. 135.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

1. *The Subdivisions of the Social Structure.*

—We have considered the family as the unit out of which the social structure is built up. We now proceed to consider the clan (which is a group of families) and the tribe (which is a group of clans). These divisions and subdivisions may be very well studied in the constitutions of Greece and Rome.¹ But we shall understand them better if we first examine the institution of totemism, which in many parts of the world is connected with the clan system, and then proceed to the clan as it can be traced among the Irish and the Scotch.

2. *Totemism.*—The totem is the name

¹ Coutanges, *La Cité Antique*.

that was given by North American Indians to some animal or plant with which they as members of a clan were related. But it is probably a mistake to regard the totem as merely a material object. 'The totemic animals among the North American Indians are not to be taken literally. They were not understood as animals of the sort we see to-day, but as mythical ancient beings of supernatural attributes who clothed themselves in those forms for their own purposes.'¹ Out of this relationship there grows, first, the attitude of the individual or clan to the totem; second, the bond which unites members of the same clan together. Thus some of the clans of Western Australia are descended from ducks, swans, or other waterfowl, and these are their totems. It is less easy perhaps to enter into the mind of those clans who had a plant for their totem. For example, the clan of the Omahas in North America had red maize for their totem, and therefore would not eat it, and yet the relation of man and tree is not uncommon. In

¹ Brinton, *Primitive Peoples*, p. 161.

The Tale of the Two Brothers, Bata could say, 'I will enchant my heart, and I shall place it upon the top of the flower of the cedar.'

3. *Totemism and Sociology*.—The totem system is important for sociology, because it is connected with the customs of marriage and inheritance. All the members of a totem clan regard each other as kinsmen or even as brothers and sisters. As such they are bound to protect and help each other. The totem bond is stronger than the bond of blood or family in the modern sense.

Out of this there arise some important consequences. In particular, persons of the same totem may not marry. As time went on, single clans seem to have subdivided into groups of clans. Yet so much of the original constitution of the original clan was retained, that persons belonging to any one of such a group of clans might not marry any person who belonged to the same group.

Such groups of clans therefore may form an intermediate division between the original clan and the tribe. For such a group of

clans it is convenient to have a name. Mr. L. H. Morgan has suggested the term phratry (taken from the Greek). He defines it as an 'exogamous'¹ division intermediate between the clan and the tribe.

4. *Totemism and Matriarchy*.—In a large majority of the totem tribes known to us at present in North America and Australia, descent is counted along the female line; that is to say, that the children belong to the totem clan of the mother, and not of the father. Matriarchy in this sense is thus connected with the most elaborate laws regulating marriage, and is inconsistent with the theories of original promiscuity which were dismissed in the last chapter. Among the non-Aryan races of Bengal there is totemism, but this is combined with descent reckoned on the side of the father. Hence totemism is not always combined with descent reckoned on the mother's side. Thus totemism does not always exhibit the same qualities.

✓ Totemism, therefore, is important to the

¹ 'Exogamous' means compelling a man to marry outside his clan or tribe.

sociologist for the light which it throws upon exogamy and genealogy. But it fails in just that portion of the human race in which we are most interested, the Aryan. The totem is not an Aryan institution. In the Homeric poems which exhibit to us Aryan institutions in their earliest known form, monogamy, and as a rule strict monogamy, is the custom.

5. *Illustration of Sociological Method*—It is clear from what has been said that neither totemism nor matriarchy is universal enough in the history of man for us to be able to formulate them as *general* laws. We are dealing here with *empirical*¹ laws of limited application. Laws, therefore, which are incapable of deductive application beyond a limited range of facts. Such laws are further incapable of being used in a synthetic manner so as to furnish by their combination a complete theory of human nature. How, therefore, is the science of sociology to be constituted in so far as it concerns the social structure? Not certainly by hasty and excessive inferences which go beyond the facts. The

¹ i.e., based upon particular cases in experience.

only generality of which these inferences are capable is to be obtained by deducing them as resting upon the ultimate facts of human nature, so far as these facts can be ascertained by psychology. But even psychology fails us when we are dealing with genius and the effects of leadership. Tarde's theory of imitation, for example, is useful when the facts are already ascertained, but his social laws do not enable us to anticipate the facts. We are thrown back, therefore, upon the historical method. Sociological considerations have led to the better understanding of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. But sociology could not have prophesied the coming of these great poems. History, however, with her backward gaze, is trying to describe them as they rise. Even she speaks with a thousand voices. And nearly every one has his theory about Homer since the days of Herodotus. Fortunately, the disputes about Homer cannot deprive us of the Homeric poems, and this, after all, is the main thing.

Unfortunately, as we proceed we are dealing with the conditions upon which human

society and the well-being of man are based. It would matter comparatively little how many suppositions were formed upon these conditions, but that the suppositions become common property, and hasty persons (including statesmen on the look-out for a taking cry) treat them as gospel, and attempt to put them into practice. For example, the socialism of Marx is based upon the bad times which we had in England after the industrial revolution at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. The inferences of Marx only apply so far as human society everywhere is like the unfortunate labouring classes in England during that period. But this is to say that Marx's hypotheses have a limited application. And the attempt to recast society on his special lines will be an expression of the will of the majority, supposing such an attempt to succeed, but it will be inadequately supported by scientific method. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that we should try to understand the foundations of the social structure.

6. *The Village Community*.—We must not suppose, indeed, that totemism has any direct importance for us. But there are other respects in which the primitive organization of the clan exhibits a remarkable uniformity. The form of land tenure is of first importance. The village community preceded the existing order of things in almost every European country.

In order to understand the village community we must start with the whole community of which it formed a part, namely, the tribe. This can very well be studied in Irish tradition. The *tuath* or tribe consisted (1) of tribesmen. These included tribesmen by blood in the male line, tribesmen by adoption or sons of tribeswomen by strangers. (2) There was further a miscellaneous class of slaves, criminals, strangers, and their descendants. All these were under the dominion of a chief—one of each tribe—and he was called *rig* or king.¹

The tribe was made up of a number of smaller communities, each of which, like the

¹ Hence the Irish kings were as numerous as the tribes.

tribe itself, consisted of a head, *ceann fine*, his kinsmen, slaves, and other retainers. And each such smaller community was called a *fine* or sept. Thus the sept answers to the clan.

Each sept occupied a certain part of the tribal territory. The plough land was tilled by the members of the sept working together. The pasture land was shared according to certain customs. The woods, mountain land, or bog, which formed the march land of the sept, was unrestricted common land.

This condition of things is found again in the Anglo-Saxon 'township,' the German 'mark,' the Russian 'mir.'

7. *The Enclosed Village* — When mankind began to pass from the stage of the hunter to that of the shepherd and husbandman, they built their dwellings on the uniform plan of an enclosed village, to protect themselves against the depredations of the aboriginal hunters who still roamed over the plains of central Europe. The enclosure, the *dun*, was the centre of the lands which were held in joint occupation. So also was it with the

German *vicus*, with its scattered dwellings, as described by Tacitus, each surrounded by an open piece of land. This custom of common cultivation has scarcely yet disappeared from England. In Nottinghamshire the three-field system with the common field is still in existence at Laxton and the neighbouring parish of Eakring. The three-field system means one with wheat or rye, a second with barley, oats, or beans, and a third fallow. At Laxton, 'each of the tenants, of whom there are thirty, has a certain acreage in each field, and most of them small pieces dotted about, so as to give each of them a bit of each class of soil which the field contains.'¹ But the very complexity of this system has brought about its disappearance, now that the old communal life has passed away.

8. *The Manor*.—This system of the township, in which the community shared as a whole, was gradually changed into the manorial system, in which a lord owned absolutely a certain portion of the land, and had rights of rent

¹ Mellors, *In and About Nottinghamshire*, p. 26; Slater, *English Peasantry*, p. 8.

(paid in service or food or money, or in all three) over the rest of the land. Under the older form of community there were a large number of unattached persons, the travelling minstrels being the chief among a whole host of itinerants. This arose out of the democratic organization of the township, which left the individual free to choose his mode of life. But military service rendered it necessary for a man to commend himself to a lord, and legal procedure called upon the freeman for a surety. These two causes helped to transform the township into a manor controlled by a lord, who was both leader and protector of the inhabitants of the manor.

9 *The Indian System*—In India there is a village system which has been studied and described by Sir Henry Maine.¹ As in the Teutonic village communities, 'there is the arable mark divided into separate lots but cultivated according to minute customary laws, binding upon all. There is the waste of common land out of which the arable mark

¹ *Village Communities*, p. 113.

has been cut, enjoyed as pasture by all the community. There is the village consisting of habitations, each ruled by a despotic pater-familias, and there is constantly a council of government to determine disputes as to custom.' The customary law of India is older than the sacerdotal or Brahminical law codified in the laws of Manu. 'What an Oriental is really attached to is his local custom.'

The transition from one system of land tenure to another is rarely accomplished without considerable injustice to individuals. And where this transition is carried out under the influence of alien ideas, the injustice is multiplied. The modern notion of absolute ownership is of recent origin, and is inapplicable in the face of more ancient systems of tenure, until all existing rights have been satisfied. It is to be feared that even when land has not been seized outright, even where compensation is offered, the persons benefited are sometimes wrongly chosen. In India, for example, representative officials have been mistaken for owners in

chief. It is to be further added that in dealing with interests of such complexity and importance, the assessors move amid a dense atmosphere of misrepresentation to which our own law courts afford but a poor analogy.

10. *Transition to Feudal System.*—The causes which out of the township produced the manor acted on a larger scale also. The lesser nobles in turn sought the protection of the great lords, and again in return for protection they became the retainers of a superior, surrendering their lands and receiving them on a feudal tenure. Thus the typical feudal state consisted of a prince from whom the lords of the manor held their manors, and of lords of the manor from whom their vassals held the land which they cultivated. Under such a system not even the prince was an absolute owner, for he was bound to protect his vassals. Only when the feudal monarchy was replaced by constitutional despotism, did the king regard himself as absolute owner of his dominions. And from this absolute ownership of the king there came the absolute

ownership of land by individuals. Or, in other words, to quote a favourite phrase, land has been put on the same footing as other real property. It is to be feared that the persons who use this phrase so glibly have rarely any understanding of the revolution which this phrase denotes.

NOTE.—*Primitive Inhabitants of Britain*.—There is a famous passage in Cæsar's *Gall War*¹ where he speaks of the inhabitants of the interior of Britain. We are told that they did not cultivate corn, and that they practised polyandry. Such statements can hardly be true of a Celtic people. The natives of the interior, however, had a tradition that they were autochthonous. On the other hand, the peoples on the southern coast were said to have immigrated from Belgium. Cæsar seems to have relied in part on the descriptions of a previous traveller, Pytheas, of the time of Alexander the Great, and also on other authorities. It seems probable that the Britons of whom he speaks must be distinguished carefully

¹ Book v, chs. xii-xiv.

into the primitive inhabitants, the Iberians, and the later immigrants the Celts. The immigration of the Celts was not yet complete. This seems a fair inference from the pressure which the Germans were already exercising upon Gaul. We must represent to ourselves therefore the great part of Britain in Cæsar's time as still inhabited by Iberians. These are probably represented to-day by the inhabitants of the extreme west both of England and Ireland. The Welsh, therefore, and the Irish of the west, are not Celts by descent but by speech only. And the question now arises, When did they lose their native language and begin to speak the language of the Celts? In attempting to answer this question, it must be remembered that the older inhabitants were pastoral and of a less developed civilization than the Celtic immigrants. ✓ The tendency of a language to disappear in face of a higher or more powerful civilization in which another language is current is well established. Further than this, there is scarcely any evidence to explain

how the Iberians came to lose their mother-speech.

Huxley, on ethnological grounds, distinguishes the primitive Britons from the Celts. He regards the Britons as the dark-eyed shorter people such as are the Welsh of to-day, while the Celts are similar to the Germanic type, and have therefore blended indistinguishably with the Anglo-Saxons of central England and Ireland.¹

¹ *Man's Place in Nature*, ch. v.

CHAPTER VII

THE MODERN STATE

1. *Transition to Modern State.*—In the last chapter we considered those forms of social union which depend upon, or are thought to depend upon, kinship, the clan, and the tribe. We now pass to the larger forms of social union which reach their culmination in the modern state. In so doing we shall trace the chief lines of development along which the modern state has arisen.

2. *Athens as Type of Modern State.*—We are now able to take up one of the themes with which we began, that modern civilization consists very largely in the imitation of Greece and Rome. In particular the Athenian state, as proposed by Pericles, interpreted by Thucydides, and adorned by the greatest manifestations of human genius, furnishes a

type by which we may still measure political advance. Pericles in the pages of Thucydides¹ declares: 'We love beauty without waste, and wisdom without effeminacy.' The next sentence is a commentary upon this. 'We use our wealth rather when there is an opportunity of doing something, than for advertisement and display.' But poverty has its temptations too. It would be useful sometimes for modern statesmen to consider what the Athenians thought about poverty. 'To confess poverty brings disgrace upon no one, but it is disgraceful not to work so as to avoid poverty.' Athenian interest in politics was understood to carry with it serious reflection with a view to correct judgments and right purposes. 'For,' says Pericles, 'we do not consider thought to be harmful to action, but we do consider it harmful not to be disciplined by reflection before we enter upon the actions which are necessary.' According to our English Pericles, our national greatness consists in muddling through.

¹ Book II, ch. xl.

3. *Machinery and Slavery*.—We thus rise with Pericles to the conception of the state as something more than a mere association of clansmen or of clansmen and strangers for the sake of protection; nor is the state any longer a feudal organism with mutual interchange of benefits from the highest to the lowest. The growth of order and peace makes it possible to treat the state as a means towards the most perfect life. It is sometimes said that the Athenian state was an artificial production because it rested upon the institution of slavery. To this it should be replied that the function of science and mechanical invention acting together is to relieve mankind as far as possible from servile offices. So far as this is done, the comparison of Athens with the modern state becomes perfectly admissible.

4. *Economic Development of Modern State*.—So long as the constituent parts of a state are of the same race, the conflicts which arise within it are mainly between the propertied classes and the poor. At first there is an aristocracy of birth consisting of the descend-

ants or representatives of the original landholders. And this class has over against it the plebeians, to use the Roman phrase—that is to say, the landless many who hire themselves out to their richer neighbours to till their fields or to pasture their sheep.¹

But as time goes on, people tend to gather together into large towns where, owing to the rise of industries, there is greater opportunity of a livelihood. This process has not been confined to modern times. Athens became a centre for the production of pottery in the ninth century B.C., and there was a Potter's Quarter or Ceramicus. This plain statement of fact almost conceals the rise of a splendid school of craftsmen. How splendid is known by those who have studied the lovely black and red figured vases of Athens. The beauty of craftsmanship such as this alone can reconcile the historian to the industrial revolution. To love the beautiful, in Pericles' phrase, we must have it before us, and this was the glory of classical

¹ Ch. VI, § 8.

antiquity. The beauty of mediæval art was not an invention of the Christian Church; it was the last flicker of an incredibly gorgeous past. The sunset lasted until about the year 1840 in England. Since then the craftsman has been separated from the designer. The designer no longer understands the material for which he is designing, and the dwarfed imagination of the workman struggles with tasks which command neither his sympathy nor respect. Never was the world of man more ugly to the outward eye, than in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Ruskin's dreams with their subtle appeal to English prejudice (he vilified the renaissance, and his readers thought he was denouncing the Pope) completed what the industrial revolution began. For it was Ruskin who taught the architects of the Gothic revival to sweep out of our churches the delightful renaissance woodwork which with all its limitations brought down to the present a living tradition of design and craftsmanship. And what took place with respect to woodwork

is an example of what happened to the other arts. Ruskin was a splendid sophist, and when a Socrates came along in the shape of Whistler, the British Demos here as elsewhere imitating the antique, gloried in ruining Whistler who dared to bring in new gods.

Let us remember, then, as we resume this history that the pageantry of ancient life still accompanied us until seventy years ago. The English nation was comparatively late in passing to the modern industrial community. What manufactures there were, men carried on in their homes, and along with them cultivated their little plots of land. We were mainly an agricultural nation. The Low Countries employed more advanced methods of weaving than we did. We could not weave the finer cloths. Nevertheless the weaving of coarser cloths was a considerable industry carried on under the domestic system in the cottages of the people. Until the eighteenth century, those who were engaged in the textile industries were generally occupied in farming as well.

The population of England was far more uniform than that of the Netherlands. In 1760 there were actually more persons employed in farming than there are to-day. The English yeoman with his corn and his cattle and his sheep (whom a sure instinct has symbolized in the figure of John Bull) came to the market towns and exchanged his wool against the manufactured goods of Ghent and Ypres and Utrecht. Hence throughout a time extending over the Middle Ages, the merchants' guilds represented the chief class of the people outside those which were on the land. The guilds were thus the most important body in many towns and they gradually gained the complete control of them, so that the Guildhall in Nottingham, as in London, is still the name of the town hall, as it is called elsewhere. Thus while the township of the Anglo-Saxon was formed by kinsmen for the sake of safety, the modern town is mainly created by the needs and the effects of the concentration of industries.

5. *Distribution of Population.*—Alongside

of this transformation of an agricultural state to a state that was chiefly engaged, firstly, in industry based on machinery, and secondly, in commerce, that is the transport of goods by land and sea and their distribution, there went conspicuous changes in the character and distribution of the population.

And first as to racial modifications: it is almost a law of nature that the more civilized communities are of mixed descent. What is taking place now in Canada, the United States, South America, Australia, South Africa, is a more or less peaceful repetition of the same process, as when a series of settlements, first of Celts, then of Anglo-Saxons and Danes, then of Normans, constituted the English people. It would seem that when the newcomers can be absorbed into the older population, this kind of invasion is a distinct gain. We in England owe much to the Jews who played so large a part in the commerce of the Middle Ages, a part continued to the present. We are indebted also to the French immigrants, the Huguenots, who brought

over improved methods in the manufacture of glass, paper, and especially of silk. The later immigrations have been largely due to our greater freedom, which has thus become an economic asset. Most recently, however, it has not been so much religious freedom, as economic freedom, that has been sought. The last invasions of England which have taken place have been largely due to the poverty of the more eastern nations. They should not, therefore, be confused with the early forms of immigration. It is doubtful whether in this latter respect we have gained or lost by the free admission of aliens. Judging, however, by the part which the Germans have played in the commercial and social life of Nottingham and other large cities, the decrease of German immigration into England is a misfortune.

✓ 6. *Town against Country*.—Alongside of the increase of population, aided by immigration, there has gone the striking concentration of large numbers of human beings into commercial and manufacturing centres. Alongside of great manufacturing communities, like

those of Lancashire and Yorkshire, there are centres of transport like Liverpool, Hull, Cardiff, and above all London. Or to express the same fact in its economic meaning, different parts of England have been devoted to different purposes, so that by variety of occupation and production an enormous number of wants are satisfied. Thus the English nation (and the same argument might be applied almost to the whole of the British Isles) is more and more widely removed from that primitive form of community more or less united in blood, from which we began.

7. *Psychological Basis of Modern State.*—We shall now consider how these complex bodies of human beings with their varied descent, their varied abodes, their varied callings are wrought up into some kind of organization. How is it that men are induced to live together in peace and to act together with some sort of harmony? How is there formed that national spirit which is not entirely a fiction? Such questions as these cannot be deduced from purely quantitative

and physical principles with Mr. Spencer. Old-fashioned books like the *Ethics* of Spinoza are far more likely to help us. In other words, the observation of human nature in its special manifestations must furnish us with those principles from which we can deduce the particular occurrences of political history. Even then we cannot prophesy them beforehand, but we can understand them in part when they have occurred.¹

8. *Imitation.* — The possibility of the modern state rests upon the tendency of groups of human beings to share the same feelings, to have the same thoughts, to act in the same way—in a word, upon imitation.² Tarde has given an interesting example. 'All these laws' (of imitation), he says, 'follow from a higher principle—the tendency of an example, once started in a social group to spread through it in geometrical progression, provided the group remains homogeneous.' Here is a case. 'When, for instance, in a group the need is felt of expressing a new idea by a new word, the first individual

¹ Ch. I, § 6.

² Cf. Ch. III, § 11.

who finds an expressive image fitted to meet that need has only to pronounce it, when immediately it is echoed from one neighbour to another, till soon it trembles on every lip of the group in question, and later spreads even to neighbouring groups.' The successive increases in our English vocabulary, therefore, are due mainly to the rapid development of our surroundings. Johnson has *telescope* and *telescopic*: the *Oxford English Dictionary* has one hundred and thirty words beginning with *tele*. Some one invents the new terms. If they are accepted their use spreads. Thus the use of the word *potential* in its electrical meaning was introduced by the great but unknown mathematician of Nottingham, George Green.

Of course these tendencies of an example to spread meet with opposition. Probably not one idea in a hundred is worthy of application outside of its immediate sphere. Hence it is useful in a state to have persons who oppose everything by a kind of instinct. To admit all novelties indiscriminately is to imitate the philosopher of Lagado, who treated

as worthy of record every casual combination of words. As against these persons there is need of a third class, who, while rejecting the obviously futile, are yet open to new ideas. There must be some readiness to imitate, even although this readiness be confined within certain limits.

The most instructive, because perhaps the most unconscious, form of imitation is found in fashion. This may be defined with appropriate seriousness as 'the imitation of the customs of upper-class society'; 'the tendency of the classes who are lower in the social scale to imitate those who are higher in the social scale.' Fashion, then, is a specific instance of the general tendency of human beings to follow their leader. That is to say, there are human beings who, for reasons which deserve investigation, exercise a certain natural authority over their fellows. Beau Brummel was the latter-day representative of men like Hotspur, 'the mark and glass, copy and book, that fashioned others.' The mediæval knight, the modern gentleman are largely products of imitation, of tradition em-

bodied from time to time in conspicuous representatives.

9. *Pre-eminent Individuals.* — We thus reach once more the pre-eminent individual, the superman.¹ The differences which hold among 'supermen' rising to very high degrees render unfruitful the attempts which have been made to mark off a pre-eminent class as such. Pre-eminent individuals arise among all classes. If we suppose the different grades of society arranged according to wealth and rank, we shall find, roughly speaking, the same relative proportion of able individuals in each class. This fact is largely obscured by tradition, but with general social advance it has become clearer. It is such men and women distributed throughout all society who originate and maintain those habits of action, feeling, and thought which determine the character of a state. The Christian Church, which, according to Dr. Johnson, it is the function of Toryism to maintain, was developed in its most characteristic form among those classes which are generally regarded

¹ Ch. I, § 20; Ch. III.

as incapable of social initiative. But this principle cuts both ways. It is a striking fact that in the history of England the old families have furnished an unusual proportion of the ability which the service of the state in its fullest sense requires. But this problem will not be solved by bare statistics, the mere counting of heads.

10. *The Popular Will*.—So far as we can speak of the popular will, it consists in universally shared feelings which seek expression in a definite form of corporate action. On examination, however, it turns out that there are few instances in modern political history where the popular will is identical with the will of a large majority of the individuals in any given community. As in the civilized republics of Greece, so in the modern constitutional states there are many political parties. Similarly in the case of religion, there are many religious parties. Hence when we use the phrase, the popular will, we are taking the part for the whole, sometimes a small minority for the whole. The popular will is a convenient legal fiction

by which those, who, for the time being, have got hold of the machinery of government, give a colour to their actions. It would seem best, therefore, to regard the state as constituted out of groups of persons more or less like-minded, and of these groups as finding expression through the pre-eminent individuals to whom reference has been made. It is, after all, in harmony with the general theory of society which is here developed that politics should be handed over to politicians, just as painting should be handed over to artists. But the eager groups which constitute political parties are capable of almost indefinite extension, and they form the nuclei round which sympathetic persons may gather. Thus it may happen sometimes that nearly a whole community is interested in politics.

II. *Historical Forms of the State.*—Political groups compete with one another in order to secure the machinery of government. The conflict is maintained in the most varied ways: sometimes by open force, sometimes by the literal survival of the

fittest, as when Spain freed herself by the Inquisition from the small Liberal minority, or France, instead of a general election, indulged in the Edict of Nantes. In the logical minds of the Spanish clergy and of the French statesmen there was room for many things, but not for that toleration which, as far as it has gone, has helped England. Our distrust of ideas, as compared with persons, is justified when we reflect that you can always renew an idea, but you cannot renew a broken tradition, still less can you restore a social group. Fortunately, social groups are more tenacious of life than is sometimes imagined. It is interesting to follow R. L. Stevenson to Pont de Montvert with its Protestant temple in the country of the Camisards. Not less striking is it to go from Whitby to Egton, where a Roman Catholic village lies amid our English Protestantism. You wonder at the persistence with which these groups of men have maintained that faith which their countrymen have condemned by so large majority. Formulas cannot always swallow up flesh and blood.

Customs embodied in human beings can leap over generations and mock at persecutors. We must not read our sociology any more than our history in order to demonstrate preconceived conclusions.

12. *Custom and Constitution*.—What we describe as the constitution of a state, therefore, is best understood as a collection of customs followed by, and embodied in, a group of human beings. Democracy is a custom. Monarchy, which in England co-exists with democracy, is a custom. The coronation of the English King is a custom carefully followed. Government by a cabinet within the cabinet is a custom. To act by precedent is a custom.

13. *The Monarchy*.—Together with the custom of having a single hereditary ruler, there go various beliefs by which the custom is supported and strengthened. Such beliefs, when they seem to be out of relation to the facts of life, are called superstitions. As Dr. Frazer has shown in *Psyche's Task*, superstition has played an important, and in many ways a useful, part in the history of mankind.

For example, monarchy, which presents certain advantages, goes along with beliefs which attribute special powers to the king or chief for the time being. In New Zealand the Maori chiefs were believed to be living *atuas* or gods. Among the Melanesians the chiefs have supernatural power derived from ghosts with whom they have intercourse somewhat on the lines laid down by the Psychical Research Society. Elsewhere the king is thought to have a definite economic value. Some of the Hill Dyaks of Borneo used to bring their seed rice to Rajah Brooke in order that he might render it fertile. What is the use of the English monarchy? A generation ago, before the workings of republican government were so well understood, we were assured by political prophets that the English monarchy would scarcely survive Queen Victoria. There seems no prospect of its ending with her great grandson. Why is this? The reasons are simple. Monarchy lies more lightly as a burden upon the great confederacy of states which constitute the British Empire than any conceivable form

of union other than monarchy. Further, the English Royal Family, since the marriage of Queen Victoria, has presented human life through a kind of solemn pageant in which the poorest look on as sympathetic spectators. I have read a good many books which offered to explain social things in general. But in all of them there is a surprising gap between the beginning of things and the coronation of George the Fifth.

CHAPTER VIII

THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON SOCIAL MORALITY

1. *Pragmatist View.*—There are two kinds of truth which ultimately coincide, but which we are bound, under the limitations of our knowledge, to treat as separate. There is truth of fact and truth of value. Of late years a school of thinkers has paid special attention to the influence of certain opinions upon our actions. And they have attempted to determine the truth of opinions by inquiring how far the effects of such opinions upon our actions is good. They make the practical value of a statement the test of its truth considered as a statement of fact. And because they have insisted upon the practical value of propositions, they have been named

Pragmatists, and their system of thought, *Pragmatism*.

2. *Pragmatism and the History of Religion*.—Now the student of the history of religion must sometimes be content to be a pragmatist. He must test beliefs, not by their relation to scientific truth, but by their value for conduct. We saw at the end of the last chapter how superstitious beliefs have supported the institution of monarchy. But they have also strengthened the respect for government generally, the respect for private property, the respect for marriage, the respect for human life. In these pages it is permissible to take these institutions for granted. The impatient reader need not go far afield to find other hypotheses more to his taste perhaps.

Now the arguments which Dr. Frazer has applied to explain, and in some degree to justify, primitive superstition, have been applied by Mr. Benjamin Kidd to the higher forms of religion. The observance of the customs of savage societies is secured by the fear of supernatural agents. It is the gods

that made fear rather than fear that made the gods. 'When we leave savage man and rise a step higher to those societies which have made some progress towards civilization, we find the prevailing religions still possessing the same distinctive features: they are always associated with social conduct, and they continue to be invariably founded upon a belief in the supernatural.¹

What do we mean by the supernatural? In the first place, we are already familiar with the distinction between the positive and normative sciences.² The supernatural cannot be explained in the terms of positive science. Again, those functions of human nature of which morality is a prominent instance—functions which find expression in the normative sciences—demand an object outside themselves other than the objects disclosed by the positive sciences. In other words, the positive sciences give us an inadequate picture of the world. The impulse towards the supernatural—towards that which lies beyond the scope of the physical sciences—

¹ Kidd, *Social Evolution*, p. 108.

² Ch. I, §§ 4, 5.

is an impulse to an object as real, though in some senses less defined, than the objects which are apprehended through the positive sciences. It is consistent with this view that morals — one of the normative sciences — should depend for its authority upon an object which is apprehended in a manner proper to itself.

It follows, further, that a form of belief from which the supernatural element has been eliminated, is no longer capable of exercising the functions of a religion. The attempt to eliminate from primitive Christianity its historical foundation in the person of Jesus follows, by a kind of necessity, the rejection of the supernatural in the sense defined above. If the religion of Jesus has nothing supernatural about it, it is not even a religion, and may well be left to the fantastic speculations of philosophers, mathematicians, and 'free-thinkers.'¹ Some investigators deny that Jesus ever existed, and invite us to imagine that the Christian tradition started from

¹ See criticism by B. W. Bacon in *Hibbert Journal*, July 1911.

nothing but a dream. It would take us too far from our subject to dwell further upon the speculations of writers who lack a disciplined historical sense.¹ Once more the appeal to history vindicates itself as a necessary check upon abstract suppositions.

3. *Intellectualism*. — Intellectualism as a modern literary movement may be described as an attempt to deduce the world from the principles of the physical sciences; an attempt which has perhaps culminated in the exquisite humour and lucid style of Anatole France. Monsieur France fortunately has so much wit that he is able to keep his writings sweet, an achievement upon which it is impossible to congratulate all his confrères. One lacks in his charming pages the note of constraint, as though his philosophy left all serious questions undecided, and dogmatized upon things that do not really matter. Religion and morality cannot be imparted through the most delicate irony. Unfortunately it is characteristic of those classes of society that are

¹ And whose names are probably unknown to most readers.

officially styled intellectual and are represented so brilliantly by Monsieur France in his own country and so heavily on this side of the Channel (shade of Erasmus!) by our 'freethinkers,' that they are unable to maintain their numbers and must continually be recruited from the outside in order to maintain the succession. Precisely those persons who complain most of western conventions are unable to conduct their lives with satisfaction to themselves outside convention.

Mr. Benjamin Kidd compares¹ the Greeks with the French and deduces from Greek intellectualism the extinction of the Greek race. This is one of the widespread opinions about classical antiquity that requires correction. It should be enough to say that the Greek Empire lasted for nearly a thousand years after the fall of Rome in 476, and thus afforded a bulwark against the Mohammedan East until modern Europe could take shape behind this barrier. The Greek armies were the finest in the world until the fatal day of Manzikert.²

¹ *Social Evolution*, p. 277.

² A.D. 1071.

4. *Outline of Religious Development.*—The earliest modes of primitive thought are illustrated by magic and ‘animism.’ The latter perhaps gives rise to ancestor worship. Side by side with private religion there goes the primitive public religion which worships gods at single shrines (henotheism). When such worships coalesce in a community, polytheism arises. This in turn is succeeded by pantheism. Upon this basis of belief the great world religions have been founded by the preaching and belief of individuals. This is notably the case with Christianity and Islam. Zarathustra and Buddha are not quite parallel instances.

5. *Magic.*—It will probably suffice, if we attempt to carry our study of religion sufficiently far to explain the more primitive elements in the history of the religion of Israel. In doing so we shall perhaps learn to do justice to contemporary primitive religions, a duty which has been made easier for us by the teaching of Dr. Frazer.¹

The term ‘magic’ is derived from the

¹ *Psyché's Task.*

Persians, and in its origin has something of the meaning of 'learning.' Magic, therefore, is best understood if we regard it first as a primitive form of learning. In its later uses the word magic specially refers to a group of ideas and customs which were current in Persia, and then, coming to the west, played a great part in the life of the Middle Ages. These were known as the black art. With this we are not concerned, but rather with the modes of thought and practice which characterize primitive societies generally in their dealings with nature. Magic is primitive applied science.

Primitive man within the limits of his knowledge is quite systematic. He applies what the logician calls 'the method of agreement.' Because two occurrences agree together in some resemblance, one is the cause of the other. But he is content with the most superficial resemblances and the slightest connexions of circumstances. As an example of the latter let us take the magical use of the name. The man is thought to belong to his name. Hence through the name you can

get control over him. Or again, through the name you can exercise those powers which belong to the owner of the name. In Egypt 'it was a man's supreme wish that his name might live, for if his name continued that which it expressed would also live on. This was the main object of the careful reiteration of the name in inscriptions on the walls of temples, stela, and other monuments, that it might be spoken and kept alive by the readers'.¹ The resemblances upon which argument is based may be illustrated by the use of the effigy. There is a widespread belief that if you make an effigy of any one, whatever you do to this effigy will happen to the person whom it represents. In the Romance of Alexander, Nektanebos makes a wax effigy of Olympias and writes her name upon it and causes the Queen to see in a dream what he said to her wax image. The 'Leech of Folkestone' in the *Ingoldsby Legends* followed precisely this venerable precedent.

Or again, it is thought that if you can obtain any of the belongings of a man, you

¹ Wiedemann, *Religion of Ancient Egypt*, p. 294

can work on him through them, the argument being that there is a kind of sympathy between a man and his possessions. When I was a small boy I was taught, when I had a tooth drawn, to put some salt upon it, and to throw the tooth into the fire. Otherwise the Devil would get hold of the tooth and ultimately of the owner. I believed and obeyed. This sympathetic tie holds on a large scale between some persons—priests or kings—and the whole of nature, or that part of nature which is concerned with the crops. We have seen Rajah Brooke of Sarawak making the corn grow.¹ Sometimes, however, it was thought that when the king or priest became old, his weakness would communicate itself to the crops. Hence it was desirable that he should give way to a younger and more vigorous successor. The king of the wood at Nemi near Rome held office until he was killed by his successor—a usage which was revived by the mad emperor Gaius. Thus ‘sympathetic magic,’ that is, the attempt to produce certain effects

¹ Ch. VII, § 13.

, by imitating them, 'does not involve in itself the idea of the supernatural, but is simply the applied science of the savage.'¹ It is important, therefore, to distinguish events described in the terms of sympathetic magic from what is truly miraculous.

6. *Animism*.—Another form of primitive reasoning is known as animism from 'anima,' a soul—namely, to explain events and changes from the presence of souls in things. This is based on the belief still widespread that nothing can happen without somebody doing it. Bad language is a relic of this primitive state of mind, and produces its uncanny effect (where people are not hardened by frequent usage) because it plunges one into an ancestry which we had almost forgotten. To treat one's fountain-pen or golf-ball or collar-stud as if it had a soul, and to talk seriously to them upon occasion, puts the speaker or hearer into a state of mind in which he will recognize his affinity to our dark fellow-subjects in West Africa. For example, Dr. Nassau, who lived for many years among the

¹ Jevons, *History of Religion*, p. 35.

Bantu tribes of West Africa, attempts to classify the spirits which they believe in as follows :—

a. Human disembodied spirits.

b. Vague beings well described by our word 'ghosts.'

c. Being something like dryads, who resent intrusion into their territory, on to their rock, past their promontory or tree. When passing the residence of one of these beings the traveller must go by silently, or with some cabalistic invocation, with bowed or bared head, and deposit some symbol of an offering or tribute, even if it be only a pebble.

d. Beings who are the agents in causing sickness and either aid or hinder human plans.

e. Beings who especially belong to the household and descend by inheritance with the family. In their honour are secretly kept a bundle of finger or other bones, nail clippings, eyes, brains, etc., accumulated from deceased members of successive generations.

f. There may be a sixth class, which may,

- however, be only a function of any of the other classes, namely, those that enter into any animal body, generally a leopard.¹

7. *Faults of Primitive Religion.*—With the help of the last two sections on magic and animism we can enter rather better into primitive religion. The world is peopled with spirits, and it is our business to keep on good terms with them, and if possible to control them. There are means of doing this which are known to certain persons, wizards, or to certain classes, like the Roman patricians. And these persons expect to be paid for their services, just as the spirits expect to be paid for their services. In a word, primitive religion has an economic basis. Only a spiritual religion can speak of gifts 'without money and without price.' The odious and terrible consequences, which the belief in animism combined with wizardry produces, can be studied in the history of Dahomey and other African countries. Yet, cruel as many of these African religions are, they exercise some control over the natives.

¹ Mary Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa*, p. 444

And the downfall of a tribal religion often means the degradation of a tribe. The growth of Mohammedanism in Africa suggests a certain affinity between Mohammedanism and primitive religion, by which it is enabled to take the place of the disappearing primitive religion.

Some reference to idolatry will be expected. This institution is far from playing the part with which it is sometimes credited. 'Idols are comparatively rare in Congo Français, but where they are used the people have the same idea about them as the true negroes have, namely, that they are things which spirits reside in or haunt, but not in themselves adorable.'¹ It is not the stone that is worshipped, but the spirit within the stone.

8. *Ancestor Worship*.—The fifth of Dr. Nassau's classes of spirits is not far removed from ancestor worship. In the more advanced Aryan civilization, ancestor worship is associated with the descent of the paternal authority. Yet it is not primal, and probably took its rise along with the patriarchate. 'Happily

¹ Kingsley, *op. cit.* p. 454.

- for man's anticipation of death,' thoughts of horror and hatred do not preponderate in ideas of deified ancestors.¹

When the Jew was gathered to his fathers, or the Roman descended to join Numa or Ancus, it was with a mind at peace so far as their ancestors were concerned. Ancestor worship was practised along with the public worship of the gods. This agrees very well with the multiplication of spirits. In such a pantheon as that which is described by Dr. ✓ Nassau, there is room almost for everybody.

Hence there is no reason for surprise when we find that ancestor worship where it exists is usually practised along with the public worship of the gods. Even in Israel ancestor worship continued till historical times. Only as the religion of Yahweh developed was ancestor worship forced into the background. Rites of sacrifice, however, which are named without condemnation by Micah, Amos, and even Isaiah, are forbidden in Deuteronomy. Even the religion of Israel did not become purely spiritual without a mighty struggle.

¹ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, II. 113; Jevons, *op. cit.* p. 191.

9. *Christianity*.—For the fear of many spirits, there was thus substituted the fear of one Lord, Yahweh. This was brought about largely by the Jewish prophets. They transformed Judæism from a primitive to a spiritual religion. But they left Judæism in the main a national religion. Under the influence of the transcendent genius of Jesus Judæism was rendered still more a religion of the spirit and, therefore, capable of being extended over the whole world. Unless the teaching and influence of Jesus had thus gone far beyond original Judæism, it would have been impossible even for the brilliant oratory and organizing power of Paul to have spread the new religion round half the Mediterranean.

The universal character of Christianity rendered it feasible for what was noble in the contemporary faiths to be absorbed into itself. But the victory of Christianity in the Roman Empire was actually prepared by these rival religions.¹

¹ Cumont, *Orientalische Religionen*.

10. *Christianity in the Roman Empire.*—

In order to understand the Roman Empire from which the modern world has grown, we must bear in mind not only the education which Rome conferred upon its provinces, but also the influence which came from the provinces to Rome. The moral inheritance of Rome was vastly enriched from the outside. The coming of the East to Rome transformed the Rome of Augustus, with its meaningless state religion and its barren individual life, into something deeper and more cosmopolitan, the Empire which was the predecessor and true source of modern Europe. Instead of recording the decline and fall of the Empire of the West, the first four centuries of the Christian era mark a new age. The individual now comes to his own, not as a citizen of Rome, but of the world of Rome, and also as the object of a divine providence which lifts him above the iron chains of destiny. And it is this latter advance which enables the man or woman, amid the ruins of a falling world, to ride the sea of time and come to new havens.

Two centuries before Augustus the East made its attack upon the West with the carnal weapons of Hannibal and Carthage. But the year in which Cybele came to Rome preceded the disaster of Zama. In the worship of Cybele the conqueror admitted to his capital the forerunner of the successive worships of Egypt, Syria, and Persia. The Baal Moloch, the Lord King of Carthage, was one day to come from another Semitic city in the train of Aurelian, and the god of Hannibal ruled over the posterity of his conquerors. To the undiscerning eye of the old-fashioned Roman it seemed as if the dregs of the East were choking the Tiber. The converted Pharisee was a better prophet than Juvenal. Upon Paul and his friends 'the ends of the world had met.' The ends of the world did indeed meet in the religion that was ultimately victorious.

✓ The Oriental priests and thinkers took the religions, often primitive, of local centres, dwelt upon what was common to them all, and by referring even coarse usages to a spiritual purpose, lifted them up towards a

• higher morality, and deepened them towards a profounder consolation. The worshippers of Cybele found themselves treated as individuals after being merged in the formalism of a purely state religion. Egypt with its mysteries appealed to and thereby almost created a sense of the after-life. Babylon with its astrology raised the after-world from the depths of Sheol and Hades to regions beyond the stars. When Syria gave to Aurelian the Baal of Palmyra, she gave also the belief in the unity of God. Lastly, the Persian view of the world, as the scene of the great conflict between good and evil, led to an eschatology which in some respects is that of the Gospels.

The priests and thinkers of Babylon and Alexandria 'before and along with Christendom spread doctrines which at the end of the antique world reached general recognition along with Christianity'¹ They scattered ideas out of which innumerable philosophies were to rise and baulk many a modern thinker of the claim to originality. Nietzsche mounted

¹ Cumont, see *Classical Rev.*, March, 1911

'6000 feet above men and time' for the moment when 'the fundamental idea of his work—namely, the Eternal Recurrence of all things'—should come to him. This dogma had already been tried and found wanting by the antique world. Nietzsche's conception of the antique world was too narrow.

The sincere student of religious history will not boggle at those ideas and usages, which Christianity inherited. They belonged to the whole world which environed Christianity. Lactantius and Arnobius and Augustine mislead us by their attacks upon the moribund religions of Rome and Greece: moribund for the worshippers of Mithra and of the Almighty Son no less than for the worshippers of Jesus. We can turn over the pages of the *Consolation of Philosophy* and wonder whether the author is a pagan or Christian. So widespread was the common fund of moral ideas!

Once more some knowledge of classical antiquity is needed that we may interpret with understanding the life which surrounds us. It is not our business here, however, to go beyond the outlines of the subject.

CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW

1. *What does Law mean?*—The Law, in the political sense of the word, is that which binds the outward conduct of a man. It is of comparatively little importance in the beginning whether the law is written down or not. Whatever form law takes, it is mainly concerned that the conduct of one person shall not seriously injure another person, or the community. At first this control was left mainly to the individual and his family or clan. But, bit by bit, the community took upon itself the satisfaction of injuries. The application of law is thus extended over a wider area.

In the second place, along with this change, law ceases to be a matter of individual and

arbitrary decisions. Unwritten custom is reduced to writing and so becomes accessible to all. But law is only unwritten so long as it remains the property of a privileged minority, whether this be a caste, a priestly tribe, or an aristocracy.¹

In the third place, the methods of primitive law disclose to us almost more than anything else the workings of the mind of the legislator. That is to say, the sociologist who sets out to interpret his facts must at least have investigated the principles of primitive law.

2. *Austin's Definition of Law*.—There is a great spiritual advantage in passing from the law of the family or the clan to the law of the state. Law now deals with individual grievances only so far as they are typical, so far as redress is needed in the interests of the community. No maxim of life is more profitable to man's peace than the maxim which warns him not to be concerned about trifles, *i.e.* things which concern only a few persons at odd times. *De minimis non curat lex*. The litigious spirit, as it appears among

¹ Maine, *Ancient Law*, p. 13.

the inhabitants of Bengal, is usually a sign of intellectual and moral weakness. On the other hand, our English spirit of compromise, which gives such offence to philosophers and fanatics who move in vacua of their own creating, tries to substitute for appeals to law or other forms of control, an agreement which shall take account of the various interests concerned in the case.

And now, before we pass to the interpretation of primitive law, let us examine the classical definition of law as it is given by Austin. 'A law is a definite command, addressed by a sovereign to his subjects to perform or abstain from performing definite acts towards certain other persons: and to a breach of this command a definite penalty is attached, called a sanction.'

A law, therefore, is definite. It must be clear in meaning and ascertainable. It is addressed by a sovereign to his subjects. Sovereignty may reside in an individual or a number of persons short of the whole or in the whole community. But the subjects are the whole community. The law is concerned

with definite human actions, not with thoughts or feelings. The law of the land has nothing to do with thoughts or feelings except in so far as they determine actions. And unless the law punishes in a definite manner, unless it can give effect to its commands, it ceases to be a law.

Now, law in this the political sense has nothing whatever in common with the law of science which states a uniformity of nature, or with the moral or æsthetic law which sets up a standard of goodness or beauty. It will be the aim of persons to whom the moral law is dear, to render the law of the land conformable to the moral law. But the law of the land derives its sole public authority from the will of the sovereign power.¹ Whoever revolts against the law, *ipso facto*, revolts against the sovereign power. This is pure resistance to force, and when the resistance

¹ Public authority, therefore, depends immediately on force actual or possible. Private authority—that is, the authority which binds the individual—is a matter of conscience. Only so long, therefore, as the state commends itself to the conscience of citizens will it be permanent. So far, however, as the state does so commend itself, it becomes the duty of good citizens to fight for the state.

becomes stronger than the sovereign power, political authority passes over to the stronger power. What was previously rebellion is now law and order and vice versa.

The confusion of political with moral law is one of the most frequent and dangerous of the political sophisms of the day. The fact that the English law is more and more the expression of the will of the majority does not increase its moral authority. Law is frequently the expression of popular passion, of prejudice, of anger. The very universality of its acceptance renders the danger of tyranny more acute. And no tyranny is more to be dreaded than that of an overwhelming majority. Freedom is possible only so long as there are forces strong enough to hold the government of the day in check. In socialist France a man who goes to church is a marked man. I am not going to arouse the prejudice of my readers by pointing out the numerous parallels which we can furnish to this tyranny on our side of the Channel. In a word, the voice of the people may be either the voice of God or it may also be the voice of the Devil; and no

one by merely counting heads can say for certain at any given instant which it is. All that a wise or good man is called upon to do is to add his voice to the general cry, if he believes it to be right, or join the minority however small, if the majority happens to be in the wrong. At the same time our principle will admit the possibility of a majority being right, and a minority being absolutely wrong. The man who always goes against the majority as such is unjustified. He is no more certain of the truth by voting with a minority always. He lessens the hope of peace which is usually secured by an overwhelming majority. And he is a martyr without a faith, because he cuts himself off from the good things which the predominance of majorities secures to the community at large. These are not merely paradoxes. They rest on the principle that mere numbers in themselves are no guide to the truth or justice of an opinion. Nor do the forms by which the opinion accepted by a majority passes into law affect this principle.

3. *The Authority of Precedent.*—Owing to

the general character of law, it is often uncertain how far it applies to any particular case. Here is the value of independent courts of judges. By interpreting the law in each case as far as possible with the general tendency of English law, they minimize the injustice which is committed when the law is applied without regard to circumstances. The confused shape in which nearly all legislation leaves deliberative assemblies makes it necessary for the judges to perform the further task of reconciling the contradictions which are usually involved in each legislative act.

Just as a single political party is rarely in possession of the whole truth, so also there are many cases in which there is a genuine doubt which of the two litigants is in the right according to law. It is our long political experience as a nation, along with the long tradition of our courts of justice, that has nourished the spirit of compromise. And it is because precedents so often represent a past compromise that they exercise so much authority.

4. *Transition to the Study of Primitive*

Law.—The main distinction between primitive and modern law is that primitive law is largely occupied with restoring a religious 'peace of the Gods' which wrongdoing has broken. Modern law, on the other hand, less and less concerns itself with religious considerations.

Again, primitive law is not occupied with the moral state of the criminal. A man is punished, and there is an end of it. On the other, it is a fiction that every one who offends against modern law is morally diseased, and that punishment is the outward mark of an inward morbid state. The administration of modern law is thus coming to regard itself as a kind of hospital board. But the only moral justification for such an attitude is the infallibility of law, which is absurd. Apart from the handling of the judges, each individual law is uncertain and unauthoritative except in so far as the sanction of the sovereign power gives authority.

It is of the essence of criminal law to inflict punishment. The criminal (by this I mean simply the condemned person) undergoes it.

- And the relation between the sovereign power and the individual is ended. There is one exception. The community has a right to protect itself against further wrongdoing on the part of the criminal. But so far as it exercises this right, it is continuing the punishment. The indeterminate sentence imports that element of uncertainty into law which contradicts the very nature of law as we found it defined. ✓

Apart from these two respects, the religious and the moral, the primitive regard for custom passes directly into the modern regard for law. Hence we may treat primitive custom, the custom of our ancestors, *mos maiorum*, as answering very closely to the law of the present.

We shall now be able to solve a difficulty which must have presented itself very forcibly to the reader. If, as we have seen, the mere will of the majority possesses no binding power upon the conscience, where is the authority of law which rests upon the will of the majority? Law, as we have seen, arises from custom, and custom spread over a long

period of years expresses the will, or at least the assent, of many successive generations. Further, custom itself is modified slowly under the influence of great personalities, when they arise. Moses, Solon, Lycurgus, impressed themselves upon Jewish, Athenian, Spartan custom. But these men so impressed themselves because they answered very closely to the circumstances of the time; they were men of destiny.¹ Hence in going against the law or custom as the case may be, one is going against the combined opinion of many persons, many successive generations, and the teaching of many successive stages of experience. Such is the positive weight of authority on the side of law.

But the very fixity of law which is largely the source of its usefulness in practical life, as a guide to conduct, must be qualified by the possibility of changing it. Law is changed partly in order to meet economic needs, partly in order to meet moral needs. Now economic needs are transient, but the moral needs are usually of a more permanent character. It is

¹ Ch. III, § 9.

- this latter element that ultimately determines the authority of law. So far as law and custom appeal to what is spiritual in man, to that extent they are authoritative. Now brute force throughout the ages, whether monarchical, oligarchic, or democratic, has claims to override the law, not on moral or even on economic grounds, but simply because of unreasoning self-will working through force: animal impulse in its rudimentary form. As against this anarchy, almost any law is binding upon the conscience.

The following paragraphs will show how even in primitive custom there is a genuine attempt to find a moral and rational solution for the conflicting interests of life. We shall take for our especial consideration the most awful of crimes, murder, and the most contemptible of crimes, lying. Between these two there is the whole gamut of wrong.

5. *Manslaughter*.—In the early stages of social development the taking of life was considered as a wrong inflicted on the family or clan of the man killed, and not as a crime against the whole state. This last is the

view of modern times. But it made no difference originally whether the manslaughter was committed by accident or intentionally; the fact of manslaughter alone was considered.

6. *Blood-feud*.—When the blood was once shed, there arose a blood-feud. For it was scarcely ever a matter between a particular relative of the murdered man and the murderer, but between the two clans to which respectively the murdered man and the murderer belonged.

The nature of the blood-feud is better understood if we bear in mind the ideas which attached to the shedding of blood, even apart from murder. 'Blood, even that from a small cut or a fit of nose-bleeding, is most carefully covered up and stamped out, if it has fallen upon the earth. Dr. Nassau says: "If it falls on the side of a canoe or a tree the place is carefully cut out and the chip destroyed." . . . A Fan (member of a tribe south of the Cameroons in West Africa) told me that a man in the village who was so weak from some cause

or other that he could hardly crawl about, had fallen into this state by seeing the blood of a woman who had been killed by a falling tree.'¹ The blood-tie can be contracted between persons not yet related. Listen to Mr. Ward, the author of *Five Years with the Congo Cannibals*. 'Silence being commanded by the beating of the big drums, which give forth a hollow sound that can be heard for miles, a charm-doctor appeared arrayed in all his mystic apparel. An incision was made in both our right arms in the outer muscular swelling just below the elbow, and as the blood flowed forth in a long stream, the charm doctor sprinkled powdered chalk and potash on the wounds, delivering the while in rapid tones an appeal to us to maintain unbroken the sanctity of the contract; and then our arms being rubbed together so that the flowing blood intermingled, we were declared to be brothers of one blood, whose interests henceforth should be united as our blood was now' (of the Bangalas, Congo Free State).²

¹ Kruš'ey, *Travels in West Africa*, p. 447. ² *Op. cit.* p. 131.

7. *Spirits of Murdered Persons*.—Along with this respect for blood, there goes the dread of the spirit of the deceased. The spirit of the murdered man was thought to be a danger to the whole community until revenge had been taken. Among some Australian tribes the 'ingna' or evil spirits, human in shape, but with long tails and upright ears, are mostly souls of departed natives, whose bodies were left to lie unburied, or whose death the avenger of blood did not expiate, and thus they have to prowl on the face of the earth and about the place of death with no gratification but to harm the living.¹ Hence we must regard manslaughter as setting up a state of things which was independent of the intentions of the murderer. In the legend of Orestes we can see the primitive view of murder transformed gradually into the later moral view.

8. *Exile of Murderer*.—A special case arose when the murdered man and the murderer belonged to the same family or clan. In this case, to kill the murderer

¹ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, ii. p. 28.

would simply be to double the evil state of things. Recourse was had, therefore, to banishment. By these means the pollution attaching to the manslayer was removed from the community. The motive of this exile has sometimes been misinterpreted by persons who have referred it to the spread of more humane views.

9. *Sanctuary*.—A check was placed upon the superstitious horror, as distinguished from the natural horror, which attended murder, by various religious institutions which arose in historic times. The principle of sanctuary includes several of these. In Israel every altar of Yahweh doubtless protected the manslayer in early times. But the oldest law denies the protection of the altar to murder with malice aforethought. Joab, by Solomon's orders, was slain on the very horns of the altar.

This right of asylum is of great importance for all those peoples in which the law of blood-vengeance is maintained. It affords an interval of protection to the manslayer, and of reflection to the avenger of blood,

and makes possible the distinction between murder and accidental homicide.

10. *Wergeld*. — Where the manslaughter took place among kinsmen, it was expiated among the Teutons and the Celts by Wergeld. The 'were' was the price of a man's life. The system was extended to personal injuries, and marked out the price appropriate to each particular case. So also in the Homeric poems, the *ποινή* or penalty was the quit money for a man's life. Here we have a different system of justice. Justice is occupied with economic injuries.

11. *Origin of Trial*. — Whether it be the right of asylum at sacred places, or the institution of compensation, an interval is afforded for the determination of the revenge to be taken or the compensation to be made. And this determination gives rise to the trial of fact. Out of this there arise certain institutions intended to determine the truth: the ordeal and the oath.

12. *The Ordeal*. — The 'ordeal' is regarded usually as an appeal to spirits or to God for an emphatic decision. 'Some ordeals,

- which possibly represent early stages of the practice, are simply magical, being processes of divination turned to legal purpose. Thus in Burmah suits were determined quite recently by plaintiff and defendant, being each furnished with a candle, equal in size and both lighted at once, he whose candle outlasts the other being adjudged to have won the case'¹ But there is a more primitive view of the ordeal still. Sin was regarded as a physical virus in Ancient Chaldæa. It is so regarded in West Africa of to-day. 'Among the Fjort, for example, a poisoner is called upon to prove his innocence by being forced to undergo the ordeal by poison; he is made to eat two or three spoonfuls of the powdered bark of the "casca" tree and drink a bottle of water. If he vomits, he is innocent; if the casca acts as a purgative he is guilty and at once slain'² In early English law there was the 'Corsnad' or trial slice of consecrated bread and cheese, which was administered from the altar with the curse that if the accused were guilty, God would

¹ *Fn. Hist.*, &c.

² Denham, *Folklore of the Fjort*, p. 17.

send the angel Gabriel down to stop his throat, that he might not be able to swallow that bread and cheese. In fact, if guilty and not a hardened offender, he was apt to fail, dry-mouthed and choking through terror, to get it down.¹ The remembrance of this ancient usage still lingers in the various related uses of the word 'choke,' or in sayings such as 'the lie stuck in his throat.'

13. *The Oath.*—The oath is really a development of the ordeal. The test which was originally applied to test the guilt or innocence of the offender, is now applied to confirm the truthfulness of the witness. When Tylor² defines an oath as 'an assertion or promise made under non-human penalty or sanction,' the term non-human is not quite accurate. Since, as we have seen, the primitive mind regards events as happening by the agency of spirits or magic, the ordeal does not fall outside this sphere. In explaining oaths we are rising above the most primitive forms of thought into the

¹ *Enc. Brit.*⁹, s.v.

² *Ibid.*

notion of analogy. For instance, among the Nagas of Assam 'two men will lay hold of a dog or fowl by head and feet, which is then chopped in two, this being emblematic of the fate expected to befall the perjurer.'¹ The use of the 'wishing-bone' in the chicken is an interesting survival among us

14 *Palaver*—Miss Kingsley says,² 'It may at first strike the European as strange, when, listening to the trial of a person for some offence before either a set of elders, or a chief, he observes that the discussion of the affair soon leaves the details of the case itself, and busies itself with the consideration of the conduct of a hyæna and a bush-cat, or the reasons why monkeys live in trees, or some such matter. These stories clearly are the equivalents to leading cases with us, and just as the English would cite *A v. B*, so would the African cite some such story as "The Crocodile and the Hen," or any other stories you find ending with, "and the people said it was right."'

¹ *Folk-lore*, 1890, 189

² *Folk-lore of the English*, 1890, 21.

15. *Analogy and Precedent.*—We thus return to the stage at which we began. The 'beast stories' which are now relegated to the nursery and the kindergarten once performed functions of a legal character. The same may be said of parables drawn from plant life. By leaving on one side human interests, they exhibited to the primitive mind legal relations in their abstract forms. When one of the Tarquins cut off the heads of the tallest plants, or when Menenius Agrippa told the fable of the parts of the body, the appeal to analogy was similar, as an act of thought, to the appeal to principle which more and more characterizes jurisprudence. Hence from the first, law has been controlled by reason. It has attempted to substitute, for the mere assertion of brute force, a rationalized authority. Law is authoritative, not because it expresses the will of the majority, but because it speaks *sub specie aeternitatis*.

BOOK II.—SOCIOLOGICAL DYNAMICS

CHAPTER X

SOCIETIES AS DEGENERATE, STATION- ARY, PROGRESSIVE

1. *Development not always Progress.*—Up to the present we have been considering Societies as they are actually constituted. We have presumed that they have followed a certain order of development, passing through savagery to barbarism, and then to civilization; from hunting to shepherd life, and then to agriculture and industrialism; from the use of stone to that of bronze, and then of iron. We have treated this development as more or less universal. Along with this there has gone a development of knowledge :

men have progressed from mythological conceptions to metaphysical conceptions. Again they have passed from narrow feelings to wider sympathies ; from the love of the family or clan to the love of the tribe or nation, and then to the love of mankind as such. Side by side there has gone a moral development. The habit of self-control, of abstention from immediate indulgences for the sake of ultimate utilities, has increased. Now all these processes—each of which demands careful study—have gone on more or less without reflection.

But this time has gone by. Human society is now so organized that man seeks to take his destiny into his own hands. He has been stimulated by the circumstance that human societies in their development not only *progress* but become *degenerate*. And with his increased knowledge of himself and his surroundings, he is becoming increasingly able to measure his progress and his retrogression. In fact, the study of sociology is not complete, until it supplies us with standards of progress and methods

• of measuring progress These standards and methods will also enable us to measure degeneracy The correct assemblage and use of statistics is obviously necessary not only to understand what human society is, but what it may become for the worse or for the better We no longer believe that all human societies progress by an inner necessity. In fact, the question is being thrust upon us whether the Western nations are really progressive at all

2 *Change as caused by Popular Will*—The break up of primitive institutions by the classes who are more or less outside their scope, the decline of religious restraint (which is the effective element in what we call religion) the passing away of modes of life which suited the needs and constitutions of our ancestors, may express the will of the passing majority. But is the will of the passing majority a good will? Can we speak of it as a will at all? The reader who has carefully followed the argument of the first book will have come to

the conclusion that there is not a complete certainty here.

3. *Popular Will as Imperfect.* — Unless the change from monarchy to oligarchy, from oligarchy to democracy, is accompanied by a beneficial change in the will, evil consequences inevitably follow upon the selfish or foolish actions of majorities. It is an easy, but also a sectarian, confidence which asserts that 'God is in all popular movements.' Infallibility thus claimed is a perilous pretence. The people were as ready as the priests to secure the death of Jesus, and the contagion of a foolish impulse is more dangerous now than in simpler days. For there is less interval between thought and effective action than ever before in the world's history. And mistakes are sometimes irremediable.

4. *Illustration from Building.* — The reader will perhaps have patience with an illustration drawn from building. Under Ruskin's influence, combined with the reaction of the Oxford movement towards mediaevalism, the parish churches of England

• have been 'restored.' Now restoration in the minds of the architects of the later Victorian era meant sweeping away all work subsequent to the thirteenth century. Under architects, architectural amateurs should also be understood, in order to include the author of the outrage on the west front of St. Albans. But there were one or two professional architects whose employment as restorers was exceedingly widespread. And one of them in particular has left his mark upon innumerable parish churches. He removed as useless beautiful woodwork of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and replaced, what he removed, by work which was supposed to be like that of the thirteenth century. In a word, architectural fashion completes for the trades connected with building, what the industrial revolution had done for country life. The tradition of common craftsmanship was broken.

The ill-considered application of building laws under the influence of the medical profession prevented the proper use of

materials. For example, the demand that the top of every window — whatever its size—shall be seven feet six from the floor, makes it impossible, as every architect knows, to design a gable for a cottage. Thus the industrial revolution was aided by these further causes, and transformed the beautiful England of 1760 into the hideous England of 1860. A further half-century has added little on the side of beauty, and much on the side of ugliness. Another generation has gone. Who shall compensate those upon whom the vision of England was thus limited?

5. *Illustration from Education.*—Let us take care that what remains in other directions is not lost. Again, under the name of Science, destructive demands are being made in another quarter. The less wise exponents of education fail to treat education as a whole. They forget that each individual can probably excel in one or two directions, but not in more. Hence the common curriculum should be strictly limited in order to leave room for special developments. By

- going too far in other directions they limit the possible development of the child's characteristic capacities. That is to say, the excessive interference with children tends to rob them of their own direct outlook upon the things of life. For intuition, a narrow educational method is substituting a distorted intelligence.

This mistake begins very early in the child's life. Children even in the slums still remember through their own quaint tradition the old games. Yet they are taught to play to order—a contradiction in terms—in obedience to the dreams of Froebel. Children still follow those mysterious instincts which fill the streets, in their proper seasons, with marbles, battledores and shuttlecocks, tops, and hoops. What secret authority determines this calendar? Will these relics survive the attacks which are being made upon them?

So far as the 'kindergarten' interferes with this real tradition and substitutes an artificial one, it tends to destroy the life proper to each locality, and dragoons the very young into a well-meant but artificial

uniformity. In passing, also, it destroys something of the charm of home. Traditional usages pass from father to son as well as from one child to another. The little girl, also, imitates the mother who is busy at home. In the old days, and in homes which deserved the name, traditions of housewifery were thus passed on. No school can replace the home in this respect. And, so far as can be judged, the school is unable to create anew home traditions which have been lost. Those who have worked among the very poor know that one of the chief causes of distress is the decline of housewifery—inability to cook and to maintain cleanliness. Housewifery is a matter of tradition in the home, not of education in the school. Just as the kindergarten takes the child away from home before the school age, so at the end of school years the employment of children disturbs the home in another way. They begin to earn money, and to enjoy freedom at an age when they have not been disciplined to use properly either money or freedom. Even where education has been carefully pursued,

it is rarely found that self-control and ability to deal with business comes before eighteen years.

6. *Summary of Destructive Tendencies.*—

Let us resume the causes which are tending to destroy in England the social order upon which the common life is mainly based—

Firstly, the examination which science has made of all the conditions of life leads incautious and ill-informed persons not only to call things into question, but to suppose that whatever is called into question is thereby deprived of authority. Hence every issue of life is thought to be subject to, and controlled by, the free action of majorities, or the popular will, or brute force.

Secondly, family ties are being weakened by the intrusion of a common education, and by the uncontrolled freedom of children who are not educated to use it.

Thirdly, political and economic aims are being pursued with a fanaticism that is almost religious, and the religious sentiment is wasting for want of exercise. Along with

this change the control exercised by religious feeling is being diminished.

The belief in God is passing away. This is largely due to the misapprehension of the meaning of science. As we saw in the first chapter, there are some sciences which may be called positive as dealing with matters of fact. These have a quite definite and limited scope. There are other sciences which deal with matters of value, *i.e.* which guide us in our choice and thereby determine our activities. It is through these latter sciences that God is specially revealed. Therefore, the positivist and exploded philosophy, upon which many social movements are based, is incapable of interpreting the Divine presence; more than this, such a philosophy goes on to deny that for which it can find no room. *Dixit insipiens in corde suo.*

Hence there is a double direction in which our English social order is being changed. We have seen the external changes which have ravaged the beauty of the English countryside; these other inward and spiritual changes, in family ties and religious life, answer

• in their widespread influence to external changes. In a word, we have almost broken with the past.

7. *Parallel from Bushmen.*—Under the influence, therefore, first, of positive science, with its natural consequent mechanical invention ; second, of capital which means the power to concentrate physical energy at any desired point ; third, educational experiments which exalt the intelligence at the expense of the individual's intuition, the English social order is breaking down. Now, unless the constructive tendencies more than keep pace with these destructive tendencies, it is almost certain that the English will find themselves in the position of those peoples who have already become degenerate, precisely owing to their inability to resist the introduction of new forces.

That degeneration actually happens in face of superior power is proved by the classical instance of the Bushmen of South Africa. They seem to have occupied at an earlier date the whole of the continent south of the Zambesi, and to have been driven to their present abodes north and south of the Orange

River by the Bantu tribes advancing from the interior of the continent. 'It seems probable that they have suffered degradation in their present environment, where they have been hunted down like wild beasts by Boers and Bechuanas.'¹

Now, the Bushmen represent many peoples who in a similar way have suffered degradation in the presence of a superior type. And the degradation usually consists in this, that the tribal institutions break down. The individual is brought too soon to an absolute freedom from traditional restraint. He has no inner guide to replace the traditional influence of custom. Thus it turns out that degeneration is mainly a moral affair.

8. *What is meant by a Stationary Society?* —Let us turn aside for a moment to consider a stationary society. By a stationary society is meant one of which the outward constitution remains the same over a long period. Such a society may be like that of China, where the various elements are so disunited that they do not concentrate in sufficient force

¹ Keane, *Ethnology*, p. 249.

to produce change. We might describe such an equilibrium as 'static'; that is to say, the maintenance of the equilibrium does not involve a conflict of forces.

There are societies, however, which maintain their equilibrium through conflict. Such an equilibrium is 'dynamic.' We have just reviewed the destructive forces which, if they were left unbalanced, would break up English society. *Let us imagine these destructive forces counterbalanced by other forces which limit them to their proper sphere.* They are no longer to be regarded as destructive, but as living elements in a healthy social order. They only become destructive when they are permitted to move unchecked. The development of positive sciences to the exclusion of the moral sciences, the use of capital and machinery without adequate regard to the life of the individual worker, the exaltation of the education supplied by the state over the education supplied by the home, the abuse of representative government by which the passing majority removes all checks upon itself—all these things sug-

gest to us their corresponding remedies. Let us suppose that the moral sciences once more assume their position along with the positive sciences, that capital and machinery are used with increased regard for the individual worker, that the home assumes again its place as an educative influence; that legislation is limited by revision from time to time; and, instead of degeneracy, we shall have continued regeneration through conflict. Each solution of a difficulty will take account of an increasing number of interests.

9. *The Roman Empire as Stationary.*—Now, from time to time in the history of the world, a society has attained this dynamic equilibrium. Forces holding one another in check develop side by side. In a word, individualism can only attain its fulness along with socialist tendencies. Nor can socialism attain its fulness unless it is checked by individualism. In order to remove ourselves from the region of platitude, let us take an instance from Rome; the exaltation of socialism into a religion is paralleled by the exaltation of the Roman Emperor into a god.

- On the other hand, the Roman state interfered very little with the family. The modern interference of the state with the family through education is only possible so long as the state allows the free development of the individual; that is, so long as the state allows the exercise 'of intuition by the individual. Committees, bureaux, can only see into the truth of things so far as they are individuals.

The advantage of the historical study of sociology is, that we can thus examine parallel instances without expecting too much from the comparison. The resemblance of the early Roman Empire to the British Empire is not too close. We shall not expect to find precise guidance in our political aims from concrete examples. Hence we shall be saved from some of the errors into which thinkers are led who attempt to deduce everything from a few abstract principles. The mistakes into which continental socialists have fallen are largely due to their having followed the 'geometrical' method described by Mill. Marx and his followers (like the political economists whom they criticized)

have attempted to deduce the history of society from a few abstract principles ; just as the mathematician deduces his consequences from a relatively small number of definitions.

Instead, therefore, of entangling ourselves in the perplexing controversies of to-day, let us examine briefly the chief conflicting elements which kept the Roman Empire for two hundred years in a state of 'dynamical equilibrium,' and helped to produce the most widely spread happiness which the world has hitherto known.

10. *The Conflicting Elements in the Roman World.*—Rome owed much to the presence of vigorous enemies upon her frontiers. The Germans in the north, the Dacians in the north-east, the Parthians in the east, had something of the effect upon Rome which the neighbours of modern Germany have had upon Germany herself. The patience and discipline of the Roman legions not only warded off the enemies of the empire, but strengthened the empire from within. The Roman legions laid the foundations of numer-

ous cities, and connected them, through magnificent roads, with the capital itself.

This external discipline was based upon an instinct for justice; an instinct which found expression in the Roman system of law. Even the institution of slavery was rendered almost tolerable under this system. The instinct for justice was developed in the long conflict between plebeians and patricians through respect for traditional customs *mos maiorum*.¹ The confidence which was generally felt in primitive Roman law led to the belief that this law must be in harmony with the notion of perfect law as expressed by the Greek stories, and with the usages common to the nations whom the Romans conquered, which were summarized as the law of nations. Thus the law of the state was gradually identified with the law of nature and the law of nations. Reinforced in this double way, Roman law exercised an authority of which we have scarcely any modern examples.

Further, the inward harmony of the empire

¹ CH. IX, § 4.

gradually arose out of the conflict between Rome and the Senate on the one hand, and the provinces and the Emperor on the other. The gradual extension of the Roman citizenship went along with the formation of new cities round the camps of the Roman legions. Each such settlement was like a new Rome.

Lastly, Roman education, controlled by the central government, replaced local traditions by the more powerful sentiments of universal justice. Cicero and Horace and Virgil were Romans, but they were also citizens of the whole world. It would be interesting to follow out still further the conflicting elements which united in the 'dynamic equilibrium' of Rome, but this sketch must serve.

11. *Effects of a Dynamic Equilibrium.*—Modern political parties attempt to substitute for a 'dynamic equilibrium' such as that of Rome, a 'static equilibrium' such as that of China. The feudal state which is the ideal of conservative thinkers, the uncontrolled liberty which is the ideal of liberal thinkers, the bureaucracy which is the ideal of socialist

* thinkers, cannot be developed in their fulness in the modern state. Hence we may dismiss, for the present, any consideration of the effects of a 'static equilibrium' such as that of China.

What, then, were the results of the 'dynamic equilibrium' of the Roman Empire for the first two Christian centuries. The first point to notice is that under the shelter of Roman law, the *Christian Church* grew until it transformed and ended the Roman Empire of Augustus. By taking advantage of the laws regulating burial clubs, the Christian Church maintained its existence even in face of the hostility of the central government. We have already seen¹ how the Eastern religions were first the enemies of the state religion and then its allies. At first this reconciliation was attempted between the Christian Church and the imperial government. But this attempted reconciliation failed from the first, and the survival of Christianity brought with it the end of the old order.

But along with the old order there also

¹ CH. VIII, § 10.

disappeared many elements of good which it contained. The spirit of scientific investigation became extinct. It lingered for a time in cities such as Athens, which were outside the main current of imperial affairs. It survived still longer in Alexandria, which was the capital of the Greek East. But even there Egyptian nationalism shook off Greek science along with Greek creeds. The opposition of science and religion, of intellect and intuition, is more deeply grounded in human nature than science is able to recognize. It would almost seem, therefore, that every state of civilization carries within itself the seeds of a new order. What is apparently the decay of an old state of things is in reality the beginning of a fresh era in which the past is born again ; an era in which intellectual forms are replaced by living intuitions.

CHAPTER XI

REGENERATION

1. *Explanation.*—We shall end upon a note of hope. The negative results which have been dwelt upon with emphasis have prepared the way for the assertion of a positive¹ principle. We have seen that neither the positive² sciences, nor mechanical invention, nor capital, nor the will of the majority are an adequate protection against degeneracy.

2. *Physiological Degeneracy.*—We have been occupied all this time with effects which scarcely anyone dares to refer to their causes. But there is a time for silence and a time for speech. And the time for silence has gone

¹ As opposed to negative.

² As opposed to normative.

by. Consumption ravages the fairest human forms. Cancer lurks in hiding to devour the lives of our friends. But there is a scourge which is more awful in its effects than either consumption or cancer. It is possible to speak of this without wounding the ear more than is necessary, and those who wish to be fully informed can learn the facts from their family physician.

It is probable that the physiological degeneracy of the Western nations is largely due to the spread of this contagion. Immoral persons of both sexes are centres of disease and death for the body politic, like cancer and phthisis for the individual organism. The peculiar danger of such persons to the community lies in the fact that they spread this contagion far and wide. It is probable that if this disease were eliminated or even seriously diminished in Western Europe, the physiological degeneracy, of which there seems little doubt, would receive a check.

3. *Eugenics*.—Now the chief and most obvious means of eliminating this contagion is by greater purity of life. In order to pro-

- duce this change of conduct it will be necessary to apply the strongest motives. How is this to be done?

Appeals to the self-interest of the individual will suffice sometimes. But this appeal must certainly be supplemented in other ways. We must take account of the interests of coming generations. An old lady, now dead, once was speaking of the health enjoyed by the family of which she was a member. Using a freedom of speech which was employed in simpler times, she said 'You see, my father was such a clean-living man'. A careful reader of English literature will find among the eighteenth-century writers references enough to this side of life.

Some persons are always offended when the topics which furnish contemporary novelists and playwrights with materials for jesting are examined with a view to racial interests. So long as licence of conduct simply contravenes a social fashion, it does not matter. But when the life and, indeed, the survival of the English race is at stake, the case is altered. We must recognize that, for the

present, social habits, which are deeply rooted in all classes must be transformed.

In order to carry out this transformation, family life must be guarded. Discipline and open-air life, as they are combined in military training, must be used to cultivate self-control. The waking of woman to a deeper self-consciousness will make greater demands upon the respect of men for women. And all these conditions will gain by their association with religion.

It now becomes clear why throughout these pages every influence has been closely examined which might tend to break down the social and religious order. That religion has the power of holding even the sexual impulse in check may be proved over and over again from primitive customs. It is no longer, however, a question of savage life, but of life rendered complex by the elaboration of comfort and of enjoyment. Yet even here the principle still holds good. A striking example of the control which religion exercises is furnished by the south of Ireland. Under the influence of the Roman

Catholic priesthood family life there reaches an average of purity which is scarcely excelled anywhere else in the world.

In England, however, the case is somewhat complicated. Two influences have been at work in the same direction. On the one hand, the High Church party, reinforced by the Oxford movement, has exalted the authority of the Christian Church. On the other hand, the Evangelical movement, beginning with Wesley, has been directed to rousing the individual conscience. It is probable also that the Modernist movement, which seeks to combine religious susceptibility with the wide outlook of science, will also contribute largely to this necessary purification of manners.

4 *Criticism of Eugenics* — It thus appears that the degeneracy of the English race, so far as it has gone, is largely due to moral inertia, and that it can largely be checked by a moral effort. Hence no method of a 'positive' character can furnish an adequate solution. Now, in the main, the methods and results which Eugenics has furnished

leave out of account, for the most part, the moral effort; that is to say, Eugenics, as ordinarily interpreted, remains at the 'positive' stage, and is therefore out of line with a complete sociological method.

5. *Relation of Religious Movements to English Morals.*—We can now proceed to a more complete survey of the regenerative forces which have been at work in English life during the last two hundred years. The upper classes have in the main been dominated by the ideal of chivalry with its implications of feudalism. The good qualities to which the chivalrous ideal gives rise do not always receive the credit due to them. Disraeli, however, with his uncanny detachment of view, saw into the meaning of the English aristocratic system, and in his best work, *Sybil*, sketched a possible compromise between the conflicting elements of the national life, assigning their proper place to the feudal aristocracy, the industrial movement, and capital. The principle of authority receives in Disraeli's novels a brilliant and suggestive exposition. Hence those who

wish to sympathize with and to understand this side of our national life will find in these novels much useful sociological material.

But indispensable as is the chivalrous type, it is not adequate to the growing demands of an increasing population. And where the element of moral order fails, lack of control leads to moral degeneracy with all its consequences. It is, however, an impressive and hopeful panorama that opens before us, as we trace the successive movements of English life which gradually created the types of the Englishman of to-day. By type I do not mean that there are classes of persons who exactly resemble each other, but that they can fulfil certain vocations. The chivalrous type of man is one who is specially suited to lead his followers in time of war or peace. But the growing complexity of modern life has multiplied to an enormous extent the types which are required. Consider the various demands which are made upon the medical profession, upon those who fill the elective local bodies, or, in another

sphere, upon those who work and control the mechanical contrivances in railways, steamships, and factories. Hence, along with the chivalrous type which reappears in new forms under new conditions, there is the world of characters described by Dickens, George Eliot, Rudyard Kipling. Walter Scott, and Thackeray each in their own way dwell upon the past, and so complete the picture. But we shall learn more from the others.

The first Englishman who deserves the name of modern was Daniel Defoe. He was the first great journalist: the first writer who made it his calling to guide public opinion, not on party lines in the narrow sense, but with a view to the well-being of the whole country. He was, to use a convenient phrase, a great 'publicist.' He gathered information from every quarter, and cultivated the power of expression until he could call to life the facts which he collected. This power of expression enabled him in later years to write *Robinson Crusoe* and other masterpieces, less known but scarcely less great.

- The charm of Defoe is due to the art with which he conceals the moral intention of his work. The succession of events in the lives of his character is mainly left to tell its own tale. There was a sound strain in our English race when Defoe could command his great audiences and keep a hearing.

It was to this sober and self-controlled part of society that the great prelates, Butler and Berkeley appealed, no less than Wesley and his first followers. As we turn over the pages of the *Gentleman's Magazine* from its beginning, in 1731, we find ourselves in an England which is deserving of a patriot's regard. If on the one hand it is unjust to estimate the Evangelical movement from the criticisms of its opponents, on the other it is not less unjust to estimate the moral life of that age from the denunciations of the pulpit. But we must try to seize the real meaning of the Evangelical movement. Wesley showed how life might be ennobled among classes of persons to whom the feudal ideal was meaningless. He lifted

minds from being servile to the ideal of Christian liberty. He thus continued in the sphere of religion what Defoe had done in the political world. I am not limiting the work of Wesley to this; but what may lie further does not concern us now. Later on the Wesleyan movement (which at first was closely associated with the national Church) was followed by similar movements outside the Church. They were religious in character, but they had effects on the political conduct of their followers.

6. *Influence of France upon England.*—Before we take up further this theme of the moral influence of the religious movements of the eighteenth century in England, and carry it to its conclusion, we must follow down from its source the influence which Rousseau exercised. The revolution which Copernicus wrought in astronomy, the discoveries of the Royal Society, the observations of travellers which extended the knowledge of nature which scientific investigation had begun to deepen, disclosed a kingdom which was open to every one.

. But so long as this knowledge was merely intellectual, so long, that is, as it remained on the level of positive science, to that extent it had but little influence upon the general mind. When, therefore, Rousseau came forward and interpreted nature as the companion of man, he replaced a purely intellectual apprehension by an intuition of nature. Just as spiritual freedom is gained when the individual has an intuition of God, so economic freedom is gained when the individual has an intuition of nature. He feels that he is in immediate relation with a world that belongs to himself no less than to other men. In this way the feudal system was struck down at its very roots. Just as religion no longer needed an intermediary between the soul and God, so the individual no longer depended upon the seigneur for his place in the world. This revolt against the power of the seigneurs had its meaning both for France and for Germany, where conditions not unlike those of serfdom still continued. The influence of Rousseau upon England was limited, therefore, by the fact that here

the individual had attained nearly complete freedom. It was also limited by Rousseau's attitude towards religion. In the *Social Contract* it is supposed that religious communion can be based upon a few general ideas. Such a suggestion made it difficult for the orthodox churchman to understand the meaning of events in France during the closing years of the eighteenth century.

Hence there was a sharp line of division between the main current of English political life and the ideas which were fermenting in the French mind. It is one of the tragedies of history that Burke, and later on Wordsworth, with all those for whom they stood, could not retain their earlier political beliefs in face of the violence of the extreme revolutionaries.

The tragedy of English history at that time consisted in this, that the industrial revolution in England was both made possible by our greater freedom,¹ and at the same time a reaction against this freedom was brought about

¹ Ch. VII, § 5.

just at the moment when the individual was being sacrificed to the new methods of production. The dissenting bodies in the Midlands helped to alleviate the mistakes and hardships which this transition involved. For example, the foundation of the New Connexion of the General Baptists in Derbyshire, Leicestershire, and Nottinghamshire throws some interesting and valuable lights upon the social and moral conditions which had just come into being. The older Independent and Baptist bodies were enabled, by their very exclusion from immediate political influence, to reap the beneficial side of the harvest of new ideas. Robert Hall, of Leicester, was one of the most influential opponents of Burke when Burke became a reactionary. Hall's political treatises are worth careful study yet, both for their insight and eloquence. Among the Unitarians, Priestley of Birmingham and Gilbert Wakefield of Nottingham may be mentioned. It is the custom to abuse Thomas Paine, but very few persons who do so have read the *Rights of Man*.

There was a party, therefore, in England

which was eager to remedy the evils which accompanied the industrial revolution. Shelley, Lord Byron, and their friends, were not isolated 'cranks,' but the influential spokesmen of a new age, along with the men already mentioned. Had it not been for the violent reaction of the English people against the French Revolution, it is possible that remedial legislation would have anticipated Lord Shaftesbury and the Factory Acts by a generation or more. It is the great achievement of English Dissent that during this dreadful interval it supplied the newly rising working class with spiritual strength and consolation.

7. *Marx on the Industrial Revolution.*—It was on the distress at the beginning of the nineteenth century in England that Marx based his work *Das Kapital*, which has been the text-book of modern continental socialism. Marx disregarded all conditions other than economical ones. For him the rest of English life had no meaning—neither its religion, nor its slowly acquired freedom, nor its wholesome traditions. The absorption of the English

nation in its conflict with Napoleon makes it impossible to treat the English industrial revolution as a type. Yet this is what Marx and his doctrinaire followers have done. Their incapacity to treat social life in its fulness makes them very doubtful guides, and the student of sociology ought to exercise very great caution in reading their works.

8. *Synthetic Method*—We have thus returned almost to our starting-point. Our method has, after all, been synthetic. We have tried to build up a systematic theory of human fellowship, not, however, in the abstract, but with a view to understanding what lies nearest to us. And we have done this with the hope that by understanding what is nearest to us we may understand other things rather better. But our synthetic method has been that of Vico rather than of Spencer. We have not tried to build up from the presumed foundation of things in the conservation of energy. Man in his actual life cannot be so interpreted, nor can man be interpreted from barren economics such as that of Marx, which leaves

out of account the history of human religion and of human marriage. If this little book contributes in the smallest degree to join sociological with historical studies it will have performed its purpose.

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CIT. I.—The *Republic* of Plato (tr. Davies and Vaughan) and the *Politics* of Aristotle (tr. Jowett) are indispensable. Vico in his *Scienza Nuova* strangely anticipates the modern use of folklore in order to explain belief in relation to practice. Those who do not read Italian may have recourse to Michelet's French translation *Cours Citoyen de l'Esprit*. The standpoint of Corneille is fairly represented by J. S. Mill in the sixth book of the *System of Logic*. Herbert Spencer's *Data of Ethics* will probably be more useful to the student than the more elaborate work, *The Principles of Sociology*. Giddings' *Elements of Sociology* may be recommended to those who find the treatment which is adopted in the present work too concrete in character.

CH. II.—Jevons' *Principles of Science*, Books II and III, should be carefully read before the student undertakes to gather statistics. The numerous works upon special localities and callings—such as Powel's on York, or Dear's on the building trades of London—represent a reaction against the treatment of social figures in isolation from their context.

CIT. III.—In order to realize the full meaning of the 'individual,' the biographies of those persons should be

studied of whom we have the fullest or the most characteristic pictures. Cicero, Dr. Johnson, Dr. Franklin, Goethe, are obvious instances. But there is another line of inquiry that may also be very profitably pursued. Particular actions may be studied in the fullest possible way; for example, the campaigns of Napoleon in 1814 afford a large number of valuable suggestions, and may be studied in a whole literature.

Ch. IV.—It is advisable for those students of sociology who have little acquaintance with the ancient world to survey the material side of ancient civilizations in such works as Erman's *Life in Ancient Egypt*, or the *Companion to Greek Studies*, or the *Companion to Latin Studies*.

Ch. V.—Miss Mary Kingsley's *Travels in West Africa* draw aside the veil which hides the primitive mind from the European mind. Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage* is, I venture to think, the most satisfactory presentation of the subject.

Ch. VI.—The clan and the tribe should be studied first in Greek and Roman history (see the text-books named above for Ch. IV.). Frazer, *Totemism*, 1911. Maine, *Village Community*.

Ch. VII.—In order to understand the modern state, we may compare the rise of modern France as described in Belloc's *French Revolution*, with the rise of modern England. Morley's *Life of Gladstone* traces in a masterly fashion the more recent history of England, and exhibits the actual working of the machinery of state. Let any one compare this biography with Trevelyan's *Early History of Charles James Fox*, and

he will be impressed by the change in the centre of political gravity from the oligarchy to the democracy, and by the accompanying rise in the moral standard in some respects.

Ch VIII.—*My Harship of the Romans* was an attempt to treat a particular religion from the sociological standpoint, and I must refer the reader to this book, imperfect as it is, if he wishes to understand the practical influence of a primitive religion upon a civilized people. The *Epochs of Jewish History* furnishes an exhaustive analysis of the Jewish religion and of the Christian religion in its beginnings. But many of the contributors would gain if they treated religion as something which was concerned with actual human beings. Only a student of sociology can escape the limitations to which a purely literary criticism is subject.

Ch IX.—*Maier's Ancient Law* 'Laws of Gortyn' in *Comparative Greek Studies*. Paswell Langmead, *English Constitutional History*. *Recht in Grundriss der Germanischen Ethik*.

Ch X.—Cunningham, *Western Civilization*. Thorold Rogers, *Elements of Interpretation of History*. Oman, *Art of War in the Middle Ages*. Symonds, *Renaissance* (especially the closing sentences of the last volume). The continental socialists, in their eagerness to make an economic experiment, are ready to sacrifice the non-economic factors of life. The socialist, therefore, should correct their point of view by the study of metaphysics. Hale and Follen and Symonds furnish that note of quietism which is especially lacking in the extreme and hasty methods of the followers of Marx.

Ch. XI.—*The Eugenics Review*. The criticism passed in the text upon the methods of the Eugenics Society is purely negative. The facts accumulated by this society are of the greatest importance. But in order to render such work more than merely speculative, it will be necessary to enlist moral and religious agencies. The established laws of Eugenics will furnish us with maxims of duty.

QUESTIONS

THESE questions are intended to serve as suggestions. The subject-matter of every paragraph in the book will furnish opportunities for raising different issues. And these may be embodied in the form of a question.

1. Define Sociology. Distinguish it from Political Economy.
2. What is the meaning of Patriotism? Consider what different forms this sentiment has taken.
3. What do you consider to be the proper functions of Patriotism?
4. How far is it possible for one nation to interfere with the life of another nation?
5. How would you proceed to collect the most important social numbers for the locality in which you live?
6. Do you think that racial differences can be overlooked in extending the franchise throughout the British Empire? Give reasons for your answer.

7. Indicate some of the limits which render impossible the explanation of Genius.
8. What traces are there in your county of man's primeval occupations?
9. How far do the inhabitants of the British Isles sustain life by hunting?
10. What reasons are there for thinking that the modern European family represents the primitive family?
11. Consider how far children would be affected by their greater dependence upon state officials.
12. Discuss the extent to which the state can safely relieve the parent of responsibility for the education of his children.
13. What traces are there in your county of the Primitive Village Community?
14. How far does the Clan system survive in Ireland?
15. Consider how far the incoming of Aliens has changed our English life.
16. What are the reasons for allowing the majority to have absolute power in the modern state?
17. Consider how far it is possible to arrange human life upon purely intellectual lines.
18. What influence upon the recent history of Japan has been exercised by the worship of ancestors?
19. How far is religious belief an active factor in English political life?
20. Distinguish between the various meanings of the term "Law": what do you understand by "Law of the Land," "Law of Nature," "Law of God"?
21. What is the use of Capital Punishment?
22. Do you think that the inhabitants of the British Isles are progressing or degenerating? Give your reasons.

- 23 Examine the statement that only the degenerate classes in Ireland are destitute
- 24 Briefly outline what you consider to be the proper education of a boy and of a girl from the tenth to the fourteenth year. Do you consider that there ought to be any difference between the two methods of education?
- 25 What qualities do you expect or desire in the member of Parliament who is to represent you?
- 26 How far is a parliamentary representative bound to voice the opinions of his constituents?
- 27 What are the chief mistakes to which public opinion is liable? Illustrate from the first half of the nineteenth century
- 28 What are the chief defects in the present state of sociology? What are the chief lines along which improvement in the science may be expected?
- 29 How far does commercial competition in time of peace resemble the actual conditions of warfare?
- 30 Is there any other means of ascertaining what is just than by resort to conflict? Explain your answer in detail

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